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INTRODUCTION

There are basically two theories concerning the nature and origin of civil government: instrumentalism and organism. The instrumentalist position holds that civil society and government are not a natural condition of human society, but they are contrived tools used to order society. In the history of Western political philosophy, the Sophists were the first to propose the instrumentalist perspective, and Hobbes and Locke popularized it. On the other hand, the organic theory proposes that civil society and government are a natural condition of human society. The organic theory holds that government institutions evolve naturally out of human society, rather than being contrived by people. In the West Aristotle was the first to clearly define the organic position “...that man is by nature a political animal.” In the twentieth century Whitehead and Toynbee have revitalized the organic theory. In the history of Chinese political philosophy, these two theories are also expounded. In this paper I will discuss the Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu’s³ (ca. 241 B. C.) position concerning these two divergent theories in order to explicate the significance of a model of governing by filial piety.

My argument is twofold. First, I will show that the chapter “On Filial Piety” (Hsiao Hsing Lan⁴) advocates an organic theory of government. This is interesting because other chapters of the Lü-shih ch’un-ch’iu (LSCC) clearly propose an instrumentalist view. Second, I will argue that the chapter “On Filial Conduct” discusses the practice of filial piety as a method (shu⁵) for governing properly. This second point is of value because it provides some practicable guidelines for applying filial piety as a government technique and policy. To support the first point, I will briefly summarize some of the different schools of thought which propose either the organic or instrumentalist theory of government, and specifically display these divergent positions in the LSCC. To further strengthen the organic position held by the chapter “On Filial Conduct”, I will explicate its arguments for filial piety being the root of all practicable virtues. To further support the second thesis, I will explicate from the chapter a five-part process of employing

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filial piety in government. Finally, I will present the three means proposed for practicing filial piety.

II. INSTRUMENTALISM AND ORGANISM

In ancient China the instrumentalist theory was the most clearly stated; while the organic position was mostly implied. The Mo Tzu (ch. 11), the Shang chün shu (ch. 7), the Kuan Tzu (ch. 31), Hsün Tzu (chs. 9 & 10), and the Han Fei Tzu (ch. 2) all propose in their own way an instrumentalist theory which bears a strong similarity to the Hobbesian state of nature which is a state of war. An interesting difference between Hobbes and these five Chinese thinkers is that Hobbes admits that his theory is only a metaphor for the state of international relations and it makes a nice expedient for rebellion; but the Chinese thinkers, being historical minded, based their theory on an historic reconstruction of the prehistoric social condition of mankind. The Chinese theory is neither a metaphor nor an expedient for rebellion; it provides a justification for the establishment and maintenance of the political offices. The historical reconstruction of the Chinese is very scientific, and it reads like the introduction to a modern political science text. However, the Chinese lacked an Aristotle to clearly define their organic theory. The Lao Tzu holds an organic theory in always assuming that a social organization has a ruler. The Chuang Tzu's position is complex, but most of the text assumes that society has a ruler. The Lun Yü holds a tacit organic theory, in a Plato-like fashion, by defining the ends of government as fulfilling the moral ends of mankind (Analects 12:17). The Mencius would appear to follow the Lun Yü; while bringing out an instrumentalist aspect in his t'ien-ming or right of rebellion theory. The Nung Chia (Agriculturalist School) would also support an organic theory.

Since the LSBC compendium on political philosophy was written by a number of people, both theories were incorporated into it. The instrumentalist theory is most strongly presented in the Shih Chün Lan in the LSBC. This passage is most like that given in the Shang Chün Shu, and it is fairly typical of the other instrumentalists, descriptions. However, it does differ from the others in that it does not mention strife between people as the means for establishing government, for that view we must turn to the Tang Ping chapter of LSBC. The passage from the Shih Chün chapter runs as follows:

Generally in speaking of human nature, our nails and teeth are inadequate for self-defence; our muscles and skin are insufficient to guard against cold and heat; our ganglings and bones are inadequate to chase profit and avoid harm; and our bravery and daring are not enough to resist the fierce ones and prohibit the strong ones. . . .

As for the masses being gathered, it is because they mutually benefit each other. The mutual benefit coming from the masses is the reason why rulership was established. Hence when rulership has been established, mutual benefit will come from the masses and human preparation can be completed.

In far antiquity there was no ruler. The people lived together and dwelled in groups. They knew their mothers but not their fathers. They did not distinguish between relatives, elder and younger, brothers, husband and wife, male and female. They were without the Way to deal with superior and inferior, elder and younger. They were without the rites for advancing and withdrawing, bowing and yielding. They were without the convenience of
clothing, shoes and belts, housing and storages. They were without the benefits of instruments, boats, carriages, inner and outer city walls, and strategically important places. ... Since far antiquity the way of the ruler has not been abolished no matter how many perished states there were. It is because it is beneficial to the empire. Hence, they abolish bad rulers and establish those who can carry out proper rulership. What is proper rulership? It should benefit the people but not benefit the ruler.

The above passage clearly presents an instrumentalist description of the origin of the state. It holds some of the major tenants of the instrumentalist perspective, i.e., men once lived in groups without structure, they were without a ruler, without the benefits of organization, and so they consciously, contractually, or at least tacitly established a ruler.

On the other hand, the chapter "on Filial Conduct" implicitly holds a version of the Confucian theory of the organic development of the state. There are at least three points which explicate the organic theory underlying this chapter. First, this chapter is written in a Confucian vein by a third century B. C. filial piety school, seeing themselves as followers of the tradition extended by Tseng Tzu. Second, the chapter uses the organic metaphor of the root in describing the role of filial piety in actualizing the "ends" of human nature. Finally, it extends the "root" metaphor by arguing that filial piety is the root of all the practicable virtues — hence, the root of all social order. Before drawing out these arguments, I would like to briefly discuss the first two points.

Although the filial piety school of Confucianism did hold some unique theories, e.g. that filial piety (hsiao⁶) and not human-kindness (jen⁴) is the origin of the virtues, nevertheless the basic world-view of the chapter is still in keeping with the implicit Confucian organic theory of the state. The Confucians, as is exemplified in this chapter, were not prone to attempting an historical reconstruction of man’s prehistoric social life because the prehistory of man was not considered to be ethically informative. Only the historical records could provide ethical insight. Thus, the Confucians only deal with historical material which presents a social organization with a ruler. And as C. C. Liang has pointed out the Confucian school would trace the origin of the state back to the tribe, the clan, and the extended family.

It is the filial piety school which would take this last point that the state grows organically from the family and the parent-child relationship.

The chapter begins by introducing the metaphor of the root (pen⁶). The opening paragraph (see the Appendix for a complete translation) outlines three important points concerning its usage of the root metaphor. First, it declares that only by paying attention to the root can one properly rule his state. Then, it quickly puns on its strong organic metaphor by stating that what is called the root does not concern agriculture (see n.5) Finally, that the root is filial piety. This organic theory for the origin of the state is further explicated in the chapter’s arguments for filial piety being the root of the practicable virtues.

III. FILIAL CONDUCT AS THE ROOT OF ALL PRACTICABLE VIRTUES

Since this chapter was written by the filial piety school of Confucianism, it is not too surprising to find it advocating a certain primacy for filial piety. Three short passages from the chapter display this:
Generally speaking, to rule the empire and to properly govern a state or fief, one must undertake the root. . . . None among all practices of undertaking the root is more venerated than fulfilling filial piety.

. . . .

Won't goodness be attained, depravities expelled, and all people in the empire made obedient by holding fast to the sole method of practicing filial piety?

. . . .

The root of instructing the people is called being filial.

And the chapter closes by stating that a person who fulfills the basic virtues, like jen, yi, li, and hsin, does it by means of being filial. The chapter, thus, presents filial piety as the origin for the state, as the maintainer of the empire, and as the root of the virtues which generate social harmony.

The chapter "On Filial Conduct" stresses hsiao as the root of all practicable virtues. This reminds one of the Classic On Filial Piety (Hsiao Ching). Although most scholars believe that the Hsiao Ching is a Han dynasty work, two of "its" passages are, however, found in LSCC. Similarly the Hsiao Ching opens with a discussion of hsiao as the root of all virtues.

Master Confucius said: "Being filial is the root of fulfilling the virtues (te); while it is what instruction originates from."

To say the least, this is only one possible interpretation of Confucius' teachings. Many would consider jen to be the root of the virtues. However, one should consider the second passage in the first chapter of the Analects.

. . . . A consummate ruler (chün tzu) should undertake the roots. The Way (Tao) will be developed after the roots have been established. As for being filial and fraternal, are they not the roots of fulfilling human-kindness (jen)?

It is no small coincidence that LSCC, the Analects, and the Hsiao Ching discuss hsiao as a root of human activity like proper government, or ethics, or as the origin of instructing the people in personal cultivation, or as what develops the Tao. Although Confucius, Mencius, and Hsün Tzu did not discuss hsiao as the root of being human, it appears that one school of Confucianism did advocate this point of view by at least the third century B.C., i.e. the period of LSCC.

However, most scholars would accept that jen is the basis of all virtues. Does this position conflict or contradict the filial piety school's position: or can the two perspectives be drawn together? The traditional view on jen and the point made by the filial piety school can be seen as complimentary, if we apply a distinction. At least three different sets of terms have been used to attempt an explanation on how jen and hsiao can both serve as roots of humanity. They are: 1) top priority vs. low priority virtue; 2) logical priority vs. temporal priority virtue; and 3) ontological vs. methodological roots.

The first distinction is proposed by Yang Yu-wei. It is based on an algebraic model were jen would be the least common denominator of the top priority, or prime, virtues like yi, li, hsin and chü. In a sense these top priority virtues are apriori, but without a transcendental meaning. This is to say that they are potentially present, but unmanifested as of yet — they are purely abstract. The low priority virtues are those which require certain actions to manifest them; they are not potential or abstract. Bravery would be a good example; it is not a virtue which necessarily defines humanity. Yet, one's
humanity could be expressed by being brave in an appropriate context. When the top priority virtues are expressed in action, they become elements of the low priority set. Hsiao, then, becomes the root of the low priority virtues because of its practical role in instruction. That is to say, the child learns how to act morally by modeling the parents.

I have proposed the second distinction of logical priority and temporal priority. What I mean here is that jen or yi or li could serve as a root of all the virtues interns of a logical priority. Given the Confucian assumption that there is an inner natural tendency which disposes one to act morally, i.e. hsing①, there should be a moral pre-disposition, logically speaking, that is the root of morality. Along these lines one could build an argument that chih, moral wisdom, was a root of all virtues because, logically speaking, appropriate moral action must be preceded by moral reflection and wisdom. However, when one confronts the methodological question: How am I to activate this in my life? Then, one must work within a temporal mode and follow a procedure. Since the parent-child relationship is the first social-moral relationship, hsiao becomes the temporal root of all practicable virtues.

R. T. Ames has proposed the third distinction of ontological and methodological roots. This position takes the organic metaphor seriously; just as there are various roots to a tree, so the roots of morality are of different types. The two major types being ontological and methodological. Ames would argue that yi would serve as an ontological root, a natural proclivity to act morally, but hsiao would serve as the methodological root.

Therefore, the position of the filial piety school is consistent with the traditional interpretation, and it helps explain the philosophical-ethical significance of hsiao in Confucian philosophy. Considering hsiao as the methodological root of moral cultivation reveals the culturally relative basis of Confucian ethics. Their ethics is grounded in the ancient Chinese social structure. That patriarchal society held that the parent-child relationship, or more specifically the father-son relationship, was in theory the primary moral social relationship. Hsiao, then, plays a dual role as both relationship and as virtue.⑤ It is a virtue in the sense of virtus or “power” that is a natural tendency or proclivity, and it is an achievement concept in that hsiao is the appropriate parent-child relation. In this sense hsiao provides the structure or method of cultivation, and it is its consequent.⑥ Hsiao is bridged to the other virtues via a moral generalization or extension of practice.

If a child was ever to learn his responsibilities as a moral agent, then it was by extension from the father-son relationship that he learned how to act. Without learning how to practice the father-son relationship, one could not learn how to practice the other interpersonal relationships. In this sense, hsiao holds a temporal or methodological priority over the other virtues. In a social-psychological developmental sense, one must first practice filial piety in order to learn how to be moral. That is, the father-son relationship serves as the primary developmental context in which a person develops his moral agency and learns what is appropriate, human-kindness, honest, etc. "By diligent practice of filial piety the way of human perfection is found."⑦ Thus, from a practical perspective hsiao is the active root of all practicable virtues.
In a political context, then, one naturally desires to have loyal and dedicated officials; according to this Confucian program, the virtue of being dedicated to one's ruler (chung\textsuperscript{18}) must be practically grounded in filial piety. Hence, LSCC advocated that the practice of filial piety is the foundation of proper government.

IV. GOVERNING WITH THE HSIAO METHODOLOGY

Above I argued that hsiao holds a developmental priority and serves as a methodological root in moral cultivation. And recall that the text itself acknowledges that hsiao is a shu, method or technique: "Won't goodness be attained, depravities expelled, and all people in the empire made obedient by holding fast to the sole method of practicing filial piety." (p. 6 n9). Below I will explicate from the chapter "On Filial Conduct" five ways in which the chapter proposes that hsiao should be utilized in governing the empire or a state. However, before I start the explication, I would like to point out an important difference here between the Confucian writers of this chapter and the so-called Legalists School (Fa Chia\textsuperscript{19}).

At first one might consider that the authors of this chapter were influenced by a Fa Chia concept of expedient-practicality by using Shen Pu-hai's term shu. Although the Confucian writers of this chapter used the term shu, they actually use the term to oppose a Legalist, especially Han Fei Tzu, theory. According to the Confucian formula, for example that presented in the Great Learning (Ta Hsūeh), the state is always put into harmony after the family. For Han Fei Tzu, it is the other way around. The LSCC position on this matter is closer to that of the Kuan Tzu which proposes that the family can be utilized as a tool to help achieve good government.\textsuperscript{18}

This Confucian element in the LSCC also opposes another Fa Chia devaluation of the family. The Confucian school and a passage of LSCC accept an analogy between the family and the state as a model for harmony and ruling.\textsuperscript{19} F. Hirth has also pointed out this analogy:\textsuperscript{20}

Filial love is the basis of all that is good and proper in family life; . . . . The state with its government is merely family life on a larger scale. The filial love of the people is shown in obedience to its parents, the ruler and his government.

K. C. Hsiao noted the Confucian program of building a fitting government on filial piety.\textsuperscript{21}

The Confucians, to be sure, placed great emphasis on the family and clan, but their purpose in so doing was to use the ethical principles implicit in filial and fraternal relationships as the foundation on which to build self-cultivation and the establishment of good government.

E. R. Hughes has also placed stress on the relationship between the family and the state for understanding ancient Chinese politics, but he sees it in a different light. He states:\textsuperscript{22}

A Westerner will never really come to understand the Chinese traditional approach to the state unless amongst other things he really tries to grasp how much the approach was conditioned by the exaltation of the family above the state. This Chinese principle . . . is set forth . . . in the Hsiao Ching.

Although Hughes writes this in his introduction to the Hsiao Ching, nevertheless
he appears to have the Aanalects (13:18) and the Mencius (7a:35) in mind because the Hsiao Ching, like this chapter from LSCC, sees dedication to one's office or ruler as an extension of filial love. However, the Aanalects and the Mencius did put personal ethics before public "laws" on the basis that without the proper grounding in family relations the social relationships could never be developed. Hence, the Fa Chia criticizing personal ethics, especially filial piety, since it interfered with the execution of public "law." However the Ch'uan Hsueh chapter of the LSCC sees dedication to one's ruler as an extension of filial love. This is expressed in a quote from that chapter:24

None among the teachings of the late sage kings are more glorious than being bilial; none are more significant than being dedicated in office. Being dedicated and filial are what rulers and parents desire the most.

This development from the filial son to the dedicated official is also a concern of the chapter "On Filial Conduct".

A. Filiality as the Foundation of Government

The chapter opens by discussing the need to "undertake the roots to establish proper order in the empire or a state or fief, and those roots are stated as the "fulfilling of filial piety". Again this chapter is working on the assumption that filial love (hsiao) is the root of all practicable virtues, and that as such it will properly order a family which will influence the governing of the empire or a state. The result of being filial is given in the second paragraph:25

If the ruler is filial, then his reputa-

tion will be significant and glorious; all subjects will be willingly submissive and obedient; all in the empire will praise him. If an official is filial, then he will be loyal in serving his ruler; he will be incorruptible while in office; and he will willingly die in facing disaster. If a knight and a commoner are filial, then the commoner will be industrious in tilling and weeding; and the knight will be firm in defense or combat; they will not tire or retreat.

In this passage LSCC has equalized all the classes in their duty of being filial. Furthermore, this passage shows that inspiring loyalty in others has two aspects. First, the subject, e.g. official, knight, or commoner, must be taught to be filial; then, the respect and obedience given the father can be extended to the ruler. Second, if the ruler is filial, then his subjects will recognize him as a virtuous ruler and willingly submit to his rule. The above passage also equates the loyal official with the filial son. Ho Ling-hsü has also pointed this out in his book on LSCC's theory of government:26

From this (citing the above passage) we can see that LSCC admitted the basis of being loyal lies in being filial. In interpreting this and speaking of its origin, being loyal and filial are synthesized into one - being loyal is contained within being filial. Undertaking to be filial is undertaking to be loyal simultaneously.

. . . LSCC seems to advocate that being loyal and being filial should be practiced in tandem.

Since loyal officials are a necessity for proper government, LSCC naturally stresses filial love in order to develop such men. However, proper government requires more than just loyal officials. Thus, the chapter concludes by reiterating
the idea that filial love is the root of all practicable virtues. A man of human-kindness is one who practices kind-heartedness (jen) in this aspect (i.e. filial piety). A man of propriety (li) is one who fulfills this aspect. A man of rightness (yi) is one who appropriately acts upon this aspect. A man of credibility (hsin) is one who is trustworthy (hsin) in this aspect. A man of strength is one who strongly carries out this aspect. Happiness is produced by complying with this. Punishment arises from violating this. Because the chapter contends that filial love is the proper foundation of society and government, it holds that filiality is the principal governing method (shu). “Won’t goodness be attained, depravities expelled, and all people in the empire made obedient by holding fast to the sole method of practicing filial piety.”

However, the chapter does not merely advocate hsiao as the foundation for good government, but it also offers arguments to support this claim.

B. The Late Sage Kings Governed by Filial Piety

One of the most common argument forms in the LSCC is argument by the authority of historical example. Traditionally the ancient Chinese looked back to the “Golden Age” of their various culture heroes who were commonly accepted as moral exemplars; they should especially be modeled by those aspiring to be virtuous emperors. Thus, it is not surprising that this chapter also cites the ancient sage rulers as governing by establishing the practice of filial piety in themselves and their people. However, the chapter assumes a sympathetic reader since the “arguments” are not well developed, but rather they depend on the reader’s belief in the tradition of the past sage kings. For example, the chapter states:

Being filial was the fundamental undertaking of the Three August-kings and the Five Emperors and the guiding principle in all affairs.

Or a little later the chapter discusses how to observe one’s filiality as a means of assessing personnel (see part D below), and then, concludes: “This was the means by which the late sage kings governed the empire well.” Finally Tseng Tzu is attributed with saying that: “There were five means by which the late sage kings properly governed the empire. . . . These five were what the late sage kings used to stabilize the empire.” (See part E below for a discussion of the five means.) These are implicit arguments. The main premiss, that these late sage kings are the authority in matters of government, is implicit, and so is the conclusion that their example should be modeled. Given the cultural context of that day most learned scholars would easily accept these implicit arguments as convincing reminders of how filial piety was employed in the past. However, these arguments make no attempt to convince the Taoists and so-called Legalists (Fa Chia). The Lao Tsu sees the development of formalized, artificial codes of hsiao as part of the disintegration of the natural harmony of the Tao.

When the six relations are not harmonious, there is filial piety and parental mercy.

The Chuang Tzu would argue that not all of the late sage kings were filial: “. . . Shun was not filial . . . (because he) exiled his
mother's brother...". The Fa Chia, on the other hand, advocated not modeling the late sage kings. In fact this idea is also present in LSCC:  

Why does a ruler not model the example of the late sage kings? It is not because he is not worthy. It is because their way cannot be modeled. However, the purpose of this chapter is not to attempt to persuade Taoists and Fa Chia, but only to present the advantages of governing by filial conduct.

C. The Filial Piety of the Son of Heaven

The chapter also offers some hypothetical syllogisms to convince a ruler that he really can secure his sovereignty and govern his empire well by filial conduct. The following passage is also of interest because it constitutes the bulk of the second chapter of the Hsiao Ching. In the following I will quote the text, supplying the implicit premises which complete the hypothetical syllogisms. I reconstruct the arguments as follows:  

premiss 1: "... if the emperor loves his parents, he would not dare to dislike others' parents."

implicit premiss 2: If the emperor does not dare to dislike others' parents, then he will be considered virtuous and the people will obey.

implicit sub-conclusion, premiss 3: Therefore, if the emperor loves his parents, then he will be considered virtuous, and the people will obey.

premiss 4: "If he respects his parents, he would not dare to ignore others' parents."

implicit premiss 5: If he does not dare to ignore others' parents, the people will consider him virtuous and submit to his rule.

implicit sub-conclusion premiss 6: If he respects his parents, the people will consider him virtuous and submit to his rule.

premiss 7: "If the emperor's love and respectfulness are exhausted in serving his parents, illumination will be added to the commoners and spread throughout the territory within the four seas." (That is to say, the people will follow his example and be filial, developing the other virtues too.)

implicit premiss 8: If illumination is added to the commoners and spreads throughout the empire, then the empire will be well governed.

implicit conclusion: If the emperor loves and respects his parents, then the empire will be well governed.

The whole passage could be simply expressed as a hypothetical argument:

If the emperor is filial, the empire will be well governed.
The emperor is filial.

Therefore, the empire is well governed.

The above arguments further imply that the filial ruler will rule for a long time; by ruling for a long time and establishing a secure dynasty, the ruler expresses his filial piety by benefiting his father's name. The overall significance of this passage is to support the claim that only by governing with filial conduct can a ruler secure a long reign and properly order his kingdom. The underlying assumption of the passage is the moral exemplar, i.e. the worthy one serves as the model for others to follow. It is interesting to note the influence of these arguments on the Han dynasty rulers who adopted hsiao as part of their reign title.

D. The Extension of Filial Piety to Others as the Basis of Good Government

According to the chapter "On Filial Conduct" it is not merely enough that the emperor be filial to rule the empire, but the officials must also express their filiality in a broad sense. That is to say, the officials must extend their filial love to other people just as the emperor's filial piety was extended to others' parents.
Actually this process of "extending filiality" is the practical means of developing other virtues from the foundation of filial love. Thus, a major criterion in assessing personnel is to observe how they "extend" their filial love. As the chapter states:

Hence, in assessing personnel, the ruler should see if one first applies it to those one is close to, and then applies it to those distant; if one first applies it to those one values, afterwards applies it to those less valued. Now if there is one here who applies it to those he is close to and values, and yet he does not ignore those he is distant from and values less, then this means that he sincerely and cautiously practices the Way of being filial. This was the means by which the late sage kings governed the empire well.

The ruler must select personnel on the basis of their "extending filial love" toward others. If the officials are noted for extending their filial love, they will provide a model for the people and win the people's respect and submission. Thus, officials who practice the way of being filial will assist in establishing proper government. The argument is supported by the concluding implicit argument by historical authority that: this was the way by which the late sage kings ruled also.

E. The Five Means of Proper Government

The final proposal given in this chapter for governing by filial conduct is also based on the above ideas of "extending filial love", and implicit argument by historical authority. The passage runs as follows:

... There were five means by which the late sage kings properly governed the empire: venerating the virtuous; venerating the honored; venerating the seniors; respecting the elders; and being merciful to the young. These were what

the late sage kings used to stabilize the empire.

Again, the ruler is persuaded with the time-tested approach of the late sage kings who well ordered their empires by extending their filial love toward five types of worthy ones. This complements the advice given the emperor in section IV.B above in that the emperor should not only extend his filial love to others, but he should especially extend it to these five types of worthy ones.

V. LSCC'S PROGRAM FOR BEING FILIAL

Before I conclude allow me to outline briefly what the chapter "On Filial Conduct" proposes as the means to express filiality.

A. Being Filial is to Protect One's Body

The first means of being filial, mentioned in this chapter, is to guard one's body because it is the most precious "thing" one's parents could give you. The text states:

Tseng Tzu said: "One's body is the body transmitted by one's parents. Behaving oneself with the body transmitted by one's parents, how could one dare not be careful?"

The body is not only a precious gift, but it is also the means by which one serves one's parents and their spirit after death. Again Tseng Tzu tells us:

... Hence, one should go boating but not swimming, or walk on the road but not on a small path. Being able to keep one's limbs and body complete in order to preserve the sacrifices in the ancestral temple can be called being
Furthermore, a son must be careful with his body because it is ultimately not his but his parents'. This point comes out in the story of Yüeh-cheng Tzu-ch'üan hurting his foot and worrying about it for months. When his disciple asks why he is so worried, he replies:41

"What a good question you have asked! I have heard from Tseng Tzu, and Tseng Tzu heard it from Confucius that since your parents gave birth to you in a complete form, the son should return the body complete. Not having his body injured, and not damaging his form, these can be called being filial..." Hence it is said: "The body is not one's personal possession; it is the body which was transmitted by one's father."

The child lives to fulfill the parents; in this sense the child learns how to live for others and sacrifice himself for others. Thus, he cultivates what is necessary to act as a moral person – other orientation. Moreover, the term body, especially when referred to with the character t'i0 represents a physical continuity, and it might be interpreted as a symbol for keeping the tradition intact.42 The body (t'i) is always instantiated as a particular behaving-person (shenP). In this organic system, then, the tradition is unfolded or disclosed through the filial and other ethical modes which the person in context conducts. After protecting his body, he can then fulfill the next two methods of being filial.

B. Being Filial is to Properly Supply One's Parents

LSCC, in its practical orientated manner, details five ways that a filial son should supply his parents.43 First, he should supply their bodies with a house, comfortable bed, and good food. Second, he must supply their visual pleasure with the proper colors and ornamentations. Third, he should supply their auditory enjoyment by playing the proper music. Fourth, he ought to supply their appetite with good food cooked appropriately. Finally, he must supply their mind by keeping them from worry by appearing, speaking and acting properly. In fact LSCC defines filial piety as supplying one's parents:44

The practice of filial piety is called "properly supplying" one's parents.

C. Being Filial is to Carry out your Father's Ideas

As we saw above in section VA, the son must also continue his filial piety after the parents have died by offering sacrifices at the ancestral temple. The son must not only supply their spirits as he did their bodies, but he must also carry out the father's ideals. Although the text is not very explicit on this point, it is strongly implied in the following quote:45

... Having one's parents contented is possible, but fulfilling it to the end is difficult. After one's parents have died, one should respectfully behave oneself. One should not leave one's parents with a notorious name. Then, he can be called one who was able to fulfill filial piety to the end.

Of course, this carrying out of ideals is an instantiation of the tradition, or as the Analects refers to it: developing the Way which is expressed through one's moral behavior. The point is to practice moral cultivation and then teach others to do likewise. Thus, there appears to be an interesting etymological relationship between hsiao and chiiao4 to teach or to
raise. That is, children are raised in a filial manner, i.e. developing the tradition, and/or students are taught by disclosing the lessons which one can develop appropriately.

It is interesting to note what the *LSCC* overlooked or, at least, did not emphasize in discussing the methods of being filial. The most apparent oversight is not keeping with Mencius’ stress on bearing offspring.46

Mencius said, “there are three things which are unfilial, and to have no posterity is the greatest of them all.”

However, the need for offspring seems to be implied in the idea of carrying on the family line as a means to fulfill the father’s ideals and the sacrifices at the ancestral temple. It may be that giving birth to children is so natural that the authors did not place emphasis on it here.

Second, the chapter stresses the material side of filial piety more than the spiritual side.47 Although the chapter does mention the carrying out of the ancestral sacrifices and continuing to realize your parents’ ideals, i.e. to continue to open up the Way of morality, the emphasis is placed on materially supplying them. Here the *LSCC* appears to move away from the standard Confucian line because the *Book of Rites* (Li Chi) quotes Tseng Tzu, as saying that supplying is the least means to express filiality.48

Tseng Tzu said, “There are three types of filial practices: the greatest practice of filial piety is to venerate one’s parents; the next is not to disgrace them; and after that to be able to properly supply them.

**VI. CONCLUSION**

This chapter provides a Confucian theory for the origin and nature of government, and it presents a methodology for applying filial piety as a major tool for stabilizing and maintaining a government. As we saw in part II, this chapter supports an implicit organic theory for the origin and nature of government. This chapter holds the strong biases that filial piety is the root of the practicable virtues, and this strengthens its organic perspective. I also noted that *hsiao* is both a natural proclivity and an achievement – both method and goal. In part IV I drew out the chapter’s five-part process of employing *hsiao* in government. Finally, I noted the chapter’s three methods for practicing *hsiao*.

Some considerations for further research based on this paper would be: First, to give a detailed analysis of the leading instrumentalists and organic theories in Chinese philosophy. Second, to attempt an historical reconstruction of the filial piety school, explaining the relationships between *LSCC*, the *Li Chi* and the *Hsiao Ching*. Third, to attempt a complete reconstruction of the philosophical positions of the filial piety school. Fourth, to further clarify the relationship between *hsiao* and the other virtues. Fifth, to further clarify the Confucian usage of the Fa Chia term *shu*, developing a fuller understanding of the term *shu* and its development. Sixth, to develop the Confucian organic theory of government by mapping out the relationship between the characters: *hsiao* and *chiaot*; *cheng*; and *chün*.

Seventh, the significance and symbol of the “body” in the Confucian tradition could be developed in more detail.

In conclusion, it should be noted that filial piety is a contingent virtue. That is to say, it is dependent on a patriarchal social structure in which family members
value obedience to the father/parents. In a different social structure or when the patriarchal structure changes, the role of filial piety changes too. Then, it could no longer serve as the methodological root for the practicable virtues or the basis of government.

NOTES


2 George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Thought*, Rev. T. L. Thorson, (Hinsdale: Dryden Press), 1973, p. 3. “... Man has no leathery armor like a turtle or spines like a porcupine, but he does have social life and the capacity to organize it effectively for survival purposes”


4 B. Watson, *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1968, pp. 172 a world government and harmony is implied at the beginning, pp. 106-112 A sage ruler is implied, but p. 327 paraphrases some of the historical reconstruction material used in the instrumentalist position; and p. 117 shows a pure anarch — some won’t follow any ruler.

5 Lü-shih ch’un-ch’u ch’i-shih teng-wu-shu, ed. by Yang Chia-lo, Vol. II, (Taipei: Ting Wen), 1977, pp. 1160; “In antiquity the means by which the late sage kings lead their people was to put agriculture before other affairs.” And p. 1162 says: “The reason why Hou Chi undertook agriculture was because he considered it to be the root of instructing the people.”


9 LSCC, Yang Chia-lo ed., pp. 527, 528-29, & 533; for critical notes on the passages from this chapter of LSCC see the Appendix notes.

10 LSCC, p. 529, and Hsiao Ching, ch. 2; see note 35 below and Appendix note 6.

11 The Hsiao Ching, Shih Ch’ao ed., (Taipei: Confucius Publishing Co.), 1976, pp. 2 & 3; this text gives the classical text with a modern Chinese translation, by Shih Kua, and an English translation by Li Li-ya since the English translation is incorrect here, rendering “chiao” or “cultivation” as “civilization”, I have followed my own translation.

In fact, the translation attributed to Li Li-ya is a plagiarism of M. L. Markra’s translation of the Hsiao Ching. E. R. Hughes, *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times*, (Taipei: Chin Shan Book Co. rept. of Oxford 1954 ed.) 1969, p. 113 gives an interpretative translation.


These three explanations were discussed by Y. W. Yang R. T. Ames and myself in Taipei 1983-84.

R. T. Ames provided these ideas in commenting on an earlier draft.

Ibid.


E. R. Hughes, Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times, p. 112.

K. C. Hsiao, Chinese Political Thought, pp. 386-387.

LSCC, p. 174.

LSCC, pp. 527-528.

Ho Ling-hsi, LSCC te Cheng-chih Li-lun, (Taipei: Taiwan Commerical Press), 1970, p. 133.

LSCC, p. 533.

LSCC, pp. 528-529.

LSCC, p. 528.

LSCC, p. 528.

LSCC, p. 530.

R. G. Wagner, Konkordanz Zum Lao-tzu, (Munchen: E. Schmitt U. M. Meyer), 1968, 10/18/2; also see 10/19/1: "... cut off... abandon yi

The people will return to filial piety and parental mercy." Although filial piety is given a better spot here, it is still part of the degeneration of the Tao.


LSCC, p. 664.

This opens the question of the dating of the Hsiao Ching which is a problem beyond the scope of this paper. However, just because there is a similar passage in the Hsiao Ching and LSCC, this does not prove that LSCC quoted the Hsiao Ching. There are other alternatives: a) LSCC and the Hsiao Ching both might have quoted a third unknown source; b) later scholars might have inserted the Hsiao Ching material into LSCC; or c) the Hsiao Ching might quote LSCC, see Appendix note 6.

LSCC, p. 529.

LSCC, p. 529, Appendix note 5.

LSCC, p. 530, Appendix notes 10 & 11.

LSCC Ch'i-shih, Yang Chia-lo ed., p. 529, see Appendix note 7.

LSCC, p. 530; Appendix notes 13 & 14.

LSCC, p. 532; Appendix notes 15 & 17.


LSCC, p. 531, see the Appendix for a translation of this passage.

LSCC, p. 532, Appendix note 18.

LSCC, pp. 532-533.

Mencius 4A:26; here I follow W. T. Chan's translation, Source Book, p. 75.
Feng Makes the distinction between physical and spiritual filial piety, see A. History of Chinese Philosophy, pp. 357-361.

Li Chi Chi-chieh, Sun Hsi-tan ed., (Taipei: Wen Shih Che), 1980, p. 1122; Bodde translates this passage in Feng's History, p. 359. A similar passage also occurs in the Tseng Tzu, Ch. 4, "Ta Hsiao," (Taipei: Chung-kuo Tzu Hsueh Ming Chu Chi-ch'eng), 1978, p. 31.

APPENDIX

The following is a complete translation of the chapter "On Filial Conduct" ("Hsiao Hsing Lan") from the LSCC. This translation is based on the reprint of Hsi Wei-yu's commentary Lu-shih Ch'un-ch'iu Ch'i-shih Teng-wu-shu, ed. by Yang Chia-lo. (Taipei: Ting Wen Book Co.), 1977, pp. 527-533.

On Filial Conduct

Generally speaking, to rule the empire and to properly-govern a state or city, one must undertake to the roots and put the peripheral last. What is called the roots does not mean tilling, weeding, seeding, or planting; it means to undertake cultivating the people. Undertaking to cultivate the people is not to enrich them when they are poor or to increase them when they are few, it is undertaking the roots. None among all practices of undertaking the roots is more venerated than fulfilling filial piety.

If the ruler is filial, then his reputation will be significant and glorious; all subjects will be willingly submissive and obedient; all in the empire will praise him. If an official is filial, then he will be dedicated in serving his ruler; he will be incorruptible while in office; and he will willingly die in facing disaster. If a knight (shih) and a commoner are filial, then the commoner will be industrious in tilling and weeding, and the knight will be firm in defense or combat; they will not tire or retreat. Being filial was the fundamental undertaking of the Three August-kings (San Huang) and the Five Emperors (Wu Ti) and the guiding principle in all affairs. Won't goodness be attained, depravities expelled, and all in the empire made obedient by holding fast to the sole method (shu) of practicing filial piety.

Hence, in assessing personnel, the ruler should first see if one applies it to those one is close to, and then applies it to those distant; if one first applies it to those one values, and then applies it to those less valued. Now if there is one here who applies it to those he is close to and values, and yet he does not ignore those he is distant from and values less, then this means that he sincerely and cautiously practices the Way of being filial (hsiao Tao). This was the means by which the late sage kings governed the empire well.

Hence, if the emperor loves his parents, he would not dare to dislike others' parents; if he respects (ching) his parents, he would not dare to ignore (lit. be slow toward) others' parents. If the emperor's love and respectfulness are exhausted in serving his parents, illumination will be added to the commoners (i.e. various families) and spread throughout the territory within the four seas. This is the result of the Son of Heaven's being filial.
Tseng Tzu said: “One’s body (shen) is the body (ti) transmitted by one’s parents. Behaving (oneself) with the body (ti) transmitted by one’s parents, how could one dare not be careful (ching)? Consequently not being dignified in dwelling, one is not filial. Being disloyal in serving a ruler, one is not filial. Being insincere in dealing with friends, one is not filial. Being without bravery in combat, one is not filial. If the above five practices are not fulfilled satisfactorily, calamity will come to one’s parents. How could one dare not be careful (ching)?

The Shang Shu (i.e. the Historical Records of the Shang Dynasty ca. 1751-1121 B.C.) says: “Among the three hundred stipulations for punishment (hsing), none among all crimes is more serious that being unfilial.”

Tseng Tzu said: “There were five means by which the late sage kings properly governed the empire: venerating the virtuous; venerating the honored; venerating the seniors; respecting the elders; and being merciful to the young. These five were what the late sage kings used to stabilize the empire. We can say that venerating the virtuous is due to their (i.e. the virtuous one’s) being close to the sage. We can say that venerating the honored is due to their being close to the ruler. We can say that venerating the seniors is due to their being close to their parents. We can say that respecting the elders is due to their being close to their elder brother. We can say that being merciful to the young is due to their being close to their younger brother.”

Tseng Tzu said: “Since the parents gave birth to him, a son does not dare to kill (him); since the parents establish him as heir, the other sons do not dare to abolish him; since his parents gave a complete form to him, a son does not dare to amputate others as a form of punishment.

“Hence, one should go boating but not swimming; or walk on the road but not on a small path. The ability to keep one’s limbs and body (ti) complete in order to preserve the sacrifices in the ancestral temple can be called being filial.”

There are five ways of supplying one’s parents: (1a) constructing the residence, (b) making the bed comfortable, and (c) regulating their good are the means to supply their bodies; (2a) establishing the five colors, (b) arranging the various shades (wu ts’ao), and (c) displaying various ornamentations are the means to supply their visual (pleasure); (3a) regulating the six pitch pipes, (b) harmonizing the five tones, and (c) composing with the eight notes are the means to supply auditory (enjoyment); (4a) cooking the five grains, (b) boiling the six domestic meats, and (c) harmonizing cooking flavor are the means to supply their appetite (lit. mouth); (5a) making your appearance tender, (b) speaking pleasant words, and (c) being respectful in approaching and withdrawing are the means to supply their mind (chih). When these five are presented in alternation and applied generously, this can be called to be adapt at supplying one’s parents.

Yüeh-cheng Tzu-ch’un hurt his foot when he descended the hall. After being cured for a few months, he still did not want to go out and had the appearance of worrying. A disciple asked him, “You master hurt your foot when you descended the hall, but after being cured for a few months, you still do not want to go out, and have a worried appearance. I dare to ask the reason why?”

Yüeh-cheng Tzu-ch’un said, “What a
good question you have asked! I have heard from Tseng Tzu, and Tseng Tzu heard it from Confucius that: since your parents gave birth to you in a complete form, the son should return it complete. Not having his body (shen) injured, and not damaging his form, these can be called being filial. A consummate person (chün zu) should not forget this even within the short time of taking one step. I almost forgot the Way of being filial (hsiao Tao). This is why I am worried.”

Hence it is said: “The body (shen) is not one’s personal possession; it is the body (kung) which was transmitted by one’s father.”

The root of instructing (chiao) the people is called “being filial”. The practice of filial piety is called “Properly supplying” one’s parents. Properly supplying is possible, (but) being respectful (ching) is difficult. Being respectful is possible, but to have one’s parents contented is difficult. Having one’s parents contented is possible, but to fulfill it to the end is difficult. After one’s parents have died, one should respectfully (ching) behave oneself (shen). One should not leave one’s parents with a notorious name. Then, he can be called one who was able to fulfill filial piety to the end. A man of human-kindness (jen) is one who practices kind-heartedness (jen) in this aspect. A man of propriety (yi) is one who fulfills this aspect. A man of rightness (yi) is one who has appropriately acted upon this aspect. A man of credibility (hsin) is one who is trustworthy (hsin) in this aspect. A man of strength (ch’ang) is one who strongly carries out this aspect. Happiness is produced by complying with this. Punishment arises from violating this.

APPENDIX NOTES

1 In the text the title occurs at the end of the chapter. The complete title is “Hsiao Hsing Lan”, i.e. “The Reference on Filial Conduct”, because this chapter is an opening chapter of one of the eight “Lan”, i.e. “Reference”, sections of the Lü-shih Ch’un-ch’ü (LSCC). The chapter begins with the expression “yi yueh”, i.e. “the first (chapter) says:” which I have omitted. Although there are some stories which deal with filial piety in other sections of LSCC, this is the only chapter that deals exclusively with the topic. However, it is interesting to note that there appears to be a chapter missing from the first “Lan” section because there are eight “Lan” sections and each has eight chapters, but the first “Lan” only has seven chapters. Moreover, the “Hsü Yi” afterward at the end of the Shih-erh Chi section conclude with a story concerning the assasin Yü Jang which does not match the rest of that chapter’s content; and in one edition the “Hsü Yi” afterward is entitled “Lien Hsiao”, i.e. “Self-disciplined Filial Piety.” Thus, one might speculate that the missing chapter was titled “Lien Hsiao” and discussed filial piety. Yin Chung-jung takes the Yü Jang story to be the only extant content of the (supposed) lost “Lien Hsiao” chapter, and so he inserts that story as the “Lien Hsiao” chapter as the last chapter of the first “Lan”; see his LSCC Chiao-shih. (Taipei: Kuo-li Pien-Yi Kuan), 1979, p. 10. Lu Wen-ch’ao also discusses this problem; see Hsü Wei-yü’s afterward to his LSCC Ch’i-shih, in LSCC Ch’i-shih Teng-wu-shu, ed by Yang Chiao-lo. (Taipei: Ting Wen Book Co.), 1977, pp. 1206-1207. Also see Ho Ling-hstü’s discussion on this point in LSCC Te Cheng-chih Li-lun. (Taipei: Taiwan Shang-wu Yin-shu), 1970, pp. 13-14.

2 “To praise” (yü) could also be read as “joy”. Kao Yu’s note follows this latter interpretation, i.e. “...all in the empire will be happy.”
This passage might remind one of the expression: “A loyal official comes from a home with a filial son” (chung ch'ien chu yu hsiao tsu chih men). "Shih" is a term of many meanings in LSCC; it can mean an "official", a "knight", a "scholar", or one who embodies all three roles. I have rendered it here as knight because of the martial context. The sage kings’ use of filial conduct to govern the empire is also mentioned in the Hsiao Ching, ed. by Shih Ch’ao. (Taipei: Confucius Publishing Co.), 1976, ch. 8, pp. 16 & 17; this text gives the classical Chinese text, a modern Chinese translation, and an English translation. The Li Chi (Record of Rites) also mentions the filiality of the late sage kings, see Li Chi Ch’i-chieh, compiled by Sun Hsitan. (Taipei: Wen Shih Che Pub. Co.), 1980, Ti 12; Chuan 46, Ti 24, “Chi Yi” chapter, p. 1108.

This whole paragraph is one of two passages where LSCC appears to quote the Hsiao Ching (Classic of Filial Piety). This paragraph, with minor character variance, comprises the bulk of chapter 2 of the Hsiao Ching; only the opening of the Hsiao Ching chapter, i.e. “the Master (Confucius) said”, and the concluding quote from the Book of Odes are missing. The second apparent quote of the Hsiao Ching in the LSCC is found in the “Ch’a Wei” chapter, see LSCC Ch’i-shih Teng-wu-shu, p. 714. Although it seems unlikely that these two passages from the Hsiao Ching were interpolated by a later writer, nevertheless it is difficult to determine whether it was LSCC which quoted the Hsiao Ching or the Hsiao Ching which quoted LSCC. For further discussion on this topic see the commentary notes compiled by Hsu Wei-yu, Ibid. p. 714; the Wei Shu T’ung-kao, comp. by the Pen-ch’u Shen-chi Pu. (Taipei: Hung Yeh Shu Ch’u Co.), 1979 reprint, pp. 423, 425, 426, & 429; and T’ien Feng-t’ai. LSCC Yen-chiu. (Taiwan: Cheng-chih Ta Hsueh, unpublished Ph. D. dissertation), 1979, p. 361 n2.

T’ien Feng-t’ai, LSCC Yen-chiu, p. 211 ends the quote here. R. Wilhelm’s translation of LSCC also ends the quote here and cites the Li Chi, “Chi Yi” chapter, see his Frühling und Herbst des Lü Bu We. (Dusseldorf: Diederich), 1979 reprint, pp. 177 & 494n2.

However, this whole paragraph is found in the Li Chi, see note 8 below, with the passage beginning “Tseng Tzu said” but it is still questionable how much of the paragraph should be attributed to Tseng Tzu.


The Shang Shu is a part of the Book of History (Shu Ching), but this passage is not extant. Kao Yu’s commentary to this passage says: “This was the means by which T’ang (the founder) of the Shang Dynasty established regulations.” T’ien Feng-t’ai, LSCC Yen-chiu, also says that this quote is not extant in the Shu Ching, p. 357. R. Wilhelm’s note here is preplexing; he says: “Heute im Kapitel Fu Hing Yün, Schu Ging. Der text ist abweichend”, i.e. “Today, in the Fu Shihng Yün chapter of the Shu Ching. The text is different.”, p. 494n3. However this quote is found in part in ch. 11 of the Hsiao Ching, p. 24 & 25; where it says: “... There are five punishments and three thousand offenses, and of these offenses there is none greater than unfiliality.”

T’ien, LSCC Yen-chiu, p. 211; ends the quote here, but the whole paragraph is found in the Li Chi, but not attributed to Tseng Tzu, see note 11 below.

This passage is found in the Li Chi, “Chi Yi” chapter, see the Li Chi Ch’i-chieh, p. 1113; for other references to the filiality of the late sage kings see note 5 above.

This phrase, “since the parents gave birth to him,” also occurs in the Hsiao Ching, ch. 9, p. 20; there it occurs in a long response of Confucius’ to a question posed by Tseng Tzu. The Hsiao Ching sentence says: “Since the parents gave birth to him, no bond could be stronger than this.”
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13 See the *Li Chi. Ch'î-ch'ieh*, ch. "Chi Yi", p. 1125 for the same expression; but the phrases are reversed, i.e., "... one should walk on the road but not a small path, or go boating but not swimming." Bodde translates this passage too, see *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 358. The expression is not attributed to Tseng Tzu, and Bodde takes it to be part of Yüeh-cheng Tzu-ch'un's response.

14 The *Li Chi Ch'î-Chieh*, Ch. "Chi Yi", p. 1125 has a similar expression: "Not disgracing himself nor shaming his parents can be called filial." Bodde also translates it, *Ibid.*, p. 358. And T'ien, *LSCC* *Yen-châu* ends the quote to Tseng Tzu here too, see p. 211.

15 This passage also occurs in the *Li Chi*, ch. "Chi Yi" p. 1125, and Bodde translates it too, see *History of Chinese Philosophy*, p. 358. Yüeh-cheng Tzu-ch'un is accepted as a disciple of Tseng Tzu's; he also appears in the *Meng Tzu* (*Mencius*), ch. IVa 24 & 25. R. Wilhelm's note also cites the *Li Chi* but attributes the passage incorrectly to Tseng Tzu; he also cites "Be Hu Tung Schii Hiau Dschuan", p. 494n6.

16 This sentence is similar to the above Tseng Tzu quote to note 7 above; it is also similar to a sentence in the *Li Chi*: "(the son) ... does not exhaust his personal (desires)." ch. "Chi Yi", p. 1108. Although I have not been able to find this quote extant in any other source, nevertheless its basic idea of "other directedness" is a primary teaching of filial doctrine as any chapter of the *Hsiao Ching* will testify to. Here I should point out that E. R. Hughes' interpretation of the *Hsiao Ching* "... camouflaging a mundane and selfish ethic." is groundless and possibly due to his poor understanding of the classic and its language, see his *Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times* (Taipei: Chin Shan Book Co. rept. of Oxford ed. of 1954), 1969, p. 112, and, for example, his mistranslation of the opening sentence of the *Hsiao Ching*, ch. 2, p. 113.

17 To better understand the meaning of "... to fulfill it to the end is difficult." We should consider the expression: "During a long illness, there won't be a filial son at the head of the bed." i.e. *Chiu ping ch'uang t'ou wu hsiao tsu.* Y Note that similar patterns are used to discuss the *Chuang Tzu*’s remarks on filial piety, see the *Concordance to Chuang Tzu*, No. 20, (Harvard Yenching Index), 1956, 37/14/9-12; and Watson. *Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*. (New York: University of Columbia Press), 1968, p. 155.

18 This whole paragraph, with minor character variance, is also found in the *Li Chi*, ch. "Chi Yi", pp. 1123-1124. Bodde translates it p. 360; note that he has read happiness (le) as music (yüeh). The last sentence here parallels the conclusion of *Hsiao Ching*, ch. 6: "... if filial piety is not pursued from beginning to end, disasters are sure to follow." p. 12 & 13. This paragraph also occurs, with some differences, in the *Tseng Tzu* (*The Book of Tseng Tzu*) (Taipei: Chung-kuo Tzu Hsieh Ming Chu Ch'i-ch'eng), 1978, Vol. 023, p. 332; p. 337 also cites the Yüeh-cheng Tzu-ch'un stroy, see note 15 above.