

## THE THOUGHT OF FRANKL, HEIDEGGER AND ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY AS VIEWED THROUGH LIFE'S EXPERIENTIAL MONTAGE

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The term “montage” comes from the world of photography and art. It is described as the art or process of making a composite picture by bringing together into a single composition a number of different pictures or parts of pictures and arranging these, superposed one upon another, so that they form a blended whole while remaining distinct.<sup>1</sup>

After writing the “montage,” which Jim teaches, for some 10 years now I have begun to see from an existential phenomenological approach which thinkers seem to be in contact with experience. Let us begin with the presuppositions underlying the approach and open the dialogue to Viktor E. Frankl, Martin Heidegger and Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy.

Frankl lays ground work for this approach when he speaks about presuppositions:

What one was in search of, again, had been presupposed all along. Literally pre-sup-posed, that is to say, (posed) laid (sup) under (underlying) his search (pre) before even setting out on it.<sup>2</sup>

Following Frankl's lead the presuppositions in this approach can be summarized by saying:

- 1) God is.
- 2) Essence precedes existence.
- 3) We are an incarnate spirit.
- 4) We are a being-in-the-world-with-others.
- 5) We are always-already-there.
- 6) The primacy of Thou-I.

For the first presupposition, “God is,” Rosenstock-Huessy asks a question then answers it, “And who is man? The being which can be inspired.”<sup>3</sup> Heidegger speaks of Being.<sup>4</sup> For this presentation the interpretation is that Being (with a capital B) is likened to authenticity and being (with a small b) inauthenticity. In everyday life, *Dasein* (there-being) resides most frequently in its inauthentic mode. Frankl says:

If God exists, however, he is infinite, and you wait for an echo in vain. The fact that no answer comes back to you is proof that your call has reached the addressee, the infinite.<sup>5</sup>

Although it is not possible to define God, Frankl seems to give the appropriate statement for this work by saying that God is infinite and human beings are finite. Frankl further says, “Infinite meaning is necessarily beyond the comprehension of a finite being.”<sup>6</sup> This means that “something” is beyond us. There has to be a beyond for the possibility of transcendence.

For the second presupposition, “essence precedes existence,” Rosenstock-Huussy maintains that we are a God given essence. God is the original Thou. For Heidegger, “*The ‘essence’ of Dasein lies in its existence.*”<sup>7</sup> [*Das “Wesen” des Daseins liegt in seiner Existenz.*] *Dasein* finds itself thrown into the world but does not know from where. The infinite exists and *Dasein* is finite, further *Dasein* cannot know its own death. For Frankl, “self-transcendence is the essence of human existence. In plain words, being human always means to be directed to something other than oneself.”<sup>8</sup> This seems “healthy,” in that there is something other than oneself.

Existence for Frankl, Heidegger and Rosenstock-Huussy is viewed in this way: For Frankl “existential” can be referred to in three ways: 1) *existence* itself; 2) the *meaning* of existence; 3) the *will* to meaning.<sup>9</sup> For Heidegger the “structure in existence” is: 1) possibility—ahead of itself; 2) facticity—thrownness; 3) falling—close-to-the-world (“they”). Heidegger’s view of “‘Existence’ means a potentiality-for-Being—but also one which is authentic.”<sup>10</sup> For Rosenstock-Huussy:

Our existence is a perpetual suffering and wrestling with conflicting forces, paradoxes, contradictions within and without. By them we are stretched and torn in opposite directions, but through them comes renewal. And these opposing directions are summed up by four which define the great space and time axes of all men’s life on earth, forming a Cross of Reality.<sup>11</sup>

For the third presupposition, “we are an incarnate spirit,” it follows that the infinite is the ground for the finite. Incarnate spirit goes with the idea that essence precedes existence. On the other side of this, Jean-Paul Sartre says, “existence precedes essence.”<sup>12</sup>

For the fourth presupposition, “we are a being-in-the-world-with-others,” Heidegger views *Dasein* in this way:

By reason of this *with-like* [*mithaften*] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of *Dasein* is a *with-world* [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is *Being-with* Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is *Dasein-with* [*Mitdasein*].<sup>13</sup>

Heidegger goes on to say to those who think otherwise, that being-with is an existential characteristic of *Dasein*:


Even *Dasein*'s Being-alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can *be missing* only *in* and *for* a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with; its very possibility is the proof of this.<sup>14</sup>

For the fifth presupposition, "we are always-already-there," Heidegger says that *Dasein* finds itself thrown into the world but does not know from where. In this thrownness *Dasein* finds itself as a being-in-the-world-with-others. In time *Dasein* says, "I am Here!" which presupposes the ground of being-with. Frankl says, "We Are Here!"<sup>15</sup> Rosenstock-Huessy says that you find yourself in relation to the other as the other calls you forth by name.

For the sixth presupposition, "the primacy of the Thou-I," Rosenstock-Huessy calls this a "Thou-I-Succession" (*Du-Ich-Reihenfolge*)<sup>16</sup> in that others are before you and come after you in time and space. Time and space do not occur in the singular for Rosenstock-Huessy. Rosenstock-Huessy says the word must first walk through us—it is the other which calls one into being. For Rosenstock-Huessy, "inspired succession"<sup>17</sup> is the primordial aspect of community. In Heidegger's approach we find ourselves being-with. Frankl says there must be something beyond the I-Thou which is community.

Now, with these presuppositions in mind and the thoughts of our three thinkers concerning them in place, we now return to the "experiential montage" with regard to time and space. Because we are an incarnate spirit we are an embodied essence, we live in space and within the duration of time. The experiential montage is a philosophy of life (*Weltanschauung*) which permits us to locate a specific being, both by the time (duration) of existence and the space (embodiment) of existence.

Rosenstock-Huessy utilizes the time/space axes of four fronts to locate the human being both collectively and personally:



**Figure I**

Heidegger also refers to the idea of “location” and its concretizing quality in the development of a specifiable identity. He gives the example of how the building of a bridge establishes a location:

The location is not already there before the bridge is... Thus the bridge does not first come to a location to stand in it; rather, a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge.<sup>18</sup>

Further on Heidegger says, “The space allowed by the bridge contains many places variously near or far from the bridge.”<sup>19</sup> So a location exists in time and space. Although something is there before the bridge such as two banks, the bridge is significant in that it establishes a location. It is in its uniqueness a span in time and space. The existence of a human being also establishes a location in time and space through which experiences come into meaning. A human being establishes a location.

The experiential montage is a way to look at a particular human being and the ongoing meaning of that life in time and space. To do this it is necessary to consider not only the specific human being but the whole surround, such as names, places and dates. As Heidegger says, “Being is the basic happening which first makes possible historical being-there amid the disclosure of the essent as a whole.”<sup>20</sup>

Frankl says that each human being unfolds within a position in life but always remains open. The human being, although residing in time and space, can select out many possibilities:

Freedom of the will is opposed to destiny. For what we call destiny is that which is essentially exempt from human freedom, that which lies neither within the scope of man’s power nor his responsibility. However, we must never forget that all human freedom is contingent upon destiny to the extent that it can unfold only within destiny and by working upon it.<sup>21</sup>

To locate the human being, if taken to the extreme, one may say: why is there something rather than nothing? Since we have said that God is infinite and that the human being as finite finds “itself” in time and space we can proceed by saying, as do Frankl, Heidegger and Rosenstock-Huessy, that the human being resides in temporality. But this temporality, lived experience, exists within the whole, in its uniqueness. There are several dimensions of time to be considered. The following diagram illustrates:

Universal Time

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Biological Time

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Social Time

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Personal Time

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### **Figure II**

The personal time line is within, within, within, somewhat like the Chinese box. The universal time could be thought of as world time, the biological time as seasons, the social time as culture and the personal time as “my time.” The social time and personal time will be the focus in each person’s experiential montage.

As Heidegger says, “Knowing oneself [Sichkennen] is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially.”<sup>22</sup> If we want to ask the proverbial question “who am I?”<sup>23</sup> it is necessary to look at the development of the human being in relation to others and in relation to a life lived in time. Time and space provide the human context for emergence of our personal meaning. Frankl also stresses the importance not only of the other(s) in personal identity and meaning but that of community life as well:


The significance of such individuality, the meaning of human personality, is, however, always related to community. For just as the uniqueness of the tessera is a value only in relation to the whole of the mosaic, so the uniqueness of the human personality finds its meaning entirely in its role in an integral whole.<sup>24</sup>

The uniqueness of each person will be reflected in the experiential montage. It is composed of the experiences one lives through in moments of time which influence one’s personality. But the life of the community is the context within which they occur. As Sandra A. Wawrytko says diversity is community, “Despite the inevitable diversity of or dissent by certain individuals in that community, that viewpoint determines the way in which society as a whole works.”<sup>25</sup>

The diversity of human beings is lived amidst the commonality of community yet each is different. This uniqueness can further be exemplified where Frankl says, “‘to be equals to be different.’ We may formulate it thus: personal being (human existence) means absolute *being different*, absolute otherness.”<sup>26</sup> From an existential view the other is the other. *You are the other*. For Frankl, “‘to be’ always means in essence ‘to be different.’”<sup>27</sup> Frankl goes on to make the distinction of different states of being which reside in simultaneity and succession:

Differences in states of being, however, can be simultaneous, or can follow one another. Consciousness assumes simultaneity of subject and object—“being different” in the spatial dimension, that is. Responsibility, on the other hand, presupposes a succession of different states, separation of a future from a present state of being. This is “being different” in the time dimension, a “becoming different.” The will, as the bearer of responsibility, strives to convert the one state into the other. The identity of the twin notions “consciousness” and “responsibility” grows out of this first subdivision of being (since “to be” equals “to be different”) into the two dimensions of simultaneity and succession.<sup>28</sup>

Utilizing the time and space axes this can be illustrated in this way:



**Figure III**

In the experiential montage, personal life is conceived as being lived through a specified period of time and being enriched and given meaning by shared experiences with others. If we utilize the thought of Henri Bergson it is possible to place this in clarity in terms of personality:


Our personality, which is being built up each instant with its accumulated experience, changes without ceasing. By changing, it prevents any state, although superficially identical

with another, from ever repeating it in its very depth. That is why our duration is irreversible.<sup>29</sup>

In speaking of the human being Frankl brings us back to temporality and its meaning which is irreversible:

Finality, temporality, is therefore not only an essential characteristic of human life, but also a real factor in its meaningfulness. The meaning of human existence is based upon its irreversible quality.<sup>30</sup>

When considering experience not only can it be marked off on a time line but the “height” and “depth” dimensions reveal the impact of presence received by others. If we mark off time using one person’s life-line a personal story (*Heilsgeschichte*) will also appear. For example:



**Figure IV**

The above example displays a finite being that came on the scene in 1940 and is living in the present and will exit stage left. Here the life of one finite being is depicted by its montage. This person is a finite being on the way toward a future, an unfinished becoming until, when in theory, it returns to Being. As Albert Camus would say the present is found giving way to the future. Rosenstock-Huessy tells us, the past was at one time the future, history is lived. Although we are in the “now” so to speak we shall go back to the beginning.

Actually, this example, as in others, does not begin in 1940 but prior to the time when “one” came onto the scene. The social (culture) context is the “within” which the person finds “itself,” as *Dasein*, into which, as Heidegger would say, each of us has been “thrown.” This social situatedness is “named,” it is *transgenerational*. The person is born into the worlds of previous generations, becomes this generation and gives rise to the next generation. The person carries this name forward. As Rosenstock-Huessy says, “Without names, communication would be impossible.”<sup>31</sup>

Let us give the family name of “Caruso” to the “being” in our example. We shall name this person T.W. Caruso. The family name, Caruso and the personal name, T.W. become the social and personal horizons and contexts within which meaning will arise and remain after T.W. makes an exit stage left. These horizons provide the context for the experiential montage which reflect the development and always shifting personal meaning of T.W.’s life.

Now, speaking of T.W., we can say for instance at age 6 (see Jean Piaget’s *The Grasp of Consciousness*) T.W. said “I am Here! I could die!” At this moment T.W., as *Dasein*, found “itself” a being-in-the-world-with-others. Through the *crème of reflection* viewed the possibility of its own death.

For T.W., as with others, *Mother is the first other* or as Harry Stack Sullivan would say the “mothering one.” Considering that the mother is a first other, mother is with us before we are ourselves. It is later through reflection that one finds oneself residing in the already-lived. We now name T.W.’s mother, Mary born in 1917 and is yet going strong. The father, Louis born in 1915 did an exit stage left in 1968.

If we further the example, on the side of the mother we find Vincenza Caruso (1882-1940), Enrico Caruso (1873-1921), Severio Caruso (1865-1948), Luigi Caruso (1754-1822) and so on. In our example of T.W.’s experiential montage, we see that one, unique, named being comes into existence at a specific time, within an already-ongoing society. Depending further upon the local, state, national and world community at large, the temporal, spatial context within which the person emerges. This begins the location found within the personal meaning of one life.

Within all this T.W., as *Dasein*, found “itself” speaking a language. For as Heidegger says:

In order to be who we are, we human beings remain committed to and within the being of language, and can never step out of it and look at it from somewhere else. Thus we always see the nature of language only to the extent to which language itself has us in view, has appropriated us to itself.<sup>32</sup>

*Dasein* finds “itself” always-already-there yet moving into the horizon as it recedes into the background. The person becomes a living context through the use of language. One is first called by name and responds. The Thou, the other which is mother first addresses the child, T.W.! The child learns to respond, to obey. The cultural context, personal identity and future possibilities are appropriated as one’s own by the use of language. For Heidegger:

The appropriating event is not the outcome (result) of something else, but the giving yield whose giving reach alone is what gives us such things as a “there is,” a “there is” of which even Being itself stands in need to come into its own as presence.<sup>33</sup>

This “on-growing,” changing experiential montage is a personal world of meaning, it is condensed and marked by time as images (moments) are arranged and superposed one upon the other where personal choices are guided in importance by values. These moments and meanings of choice found in the montage reveal the “who I am” of each person:

One practical example illustrates just what the montage means for the person, already exists in the photograph album. An experiential montage is in that album, it is composed of already developed images which stay within and help create the bounds of personal meaning. Each image says something about (and to) the person who has taken the image and mounted it in a personal book. Leafing through the album reveals quick reflections of a self—of who one is. Usually pictures are of significant moments, seemingly insignificant moments to others perhaps but each is important to that person. The montage in the album shows how personal meaning emerges, how it has been condensed and how it is re-lived, changed, added on to and how it is saved and savored by the person. It is an ongoing life-line describing and illustrating the always emerging meaning of “who am I?”<sup>34</sup>

When you look at a photo album you are already-thrown into reflection. The photo album reflects the “who I am” and the “who I have aspired to be” (this always remains open and incomplete). Although this presentation is on the interpersonal, in T.W.’s montage, we could for example include places such as: Australia, Hong Kong, Italy, England, U.S.A. and so on. Places, events and such are usually experienced or connected with others. The montage includes those who are closest-to, with whom one shares dialogue and with whom one is involved by choice. These are named, significant others whose ability to affect personal meaning distinguish them from knowledge about others one may know or enemies against whom one may define oneself. From the center outward are significant others, acquaintances, knowledge about others and enemies. The person, as *Dasein*, finds “itself” in the picture that is open and in flux.

Each person is a living montage moving toward a future, “unfolding,” as Frankl would say. In time the person unfolds like a lotus blossom coming into full flower. The experiential montage is not a static image. It is rather a

becoming, a scheme as Bergson would say, “The scheme is tentatively what the image is decisively. It presents in terms of *becoming*, dynamically, what the images give us statically as *already made*.”<sup>35</sup> For Heidegger, “The unity of the horizontal schemata of future, Present, and having been, is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality.”<sup>36</sup> The unity is found residing in the “in-order-to,” connected with the “for-the-sake-of,” for Heidegger. For Frankl, “Having been is also a kind of being, and perhaps the surest kind.”<sup>37</sup>

As one reflects on the past, that is, from the eternal present within which one resides one moves toward the future. Since the human being is a being-with, it is the other which calls one into existence. It is a first other (mother) who calls the child into existence by name, by saying, in this instance, T.W.! For Heidegger, “It is in words and language that things first come into being and are.”<sup>38</sup> For Rosenstock-Huessy:

The soul must be called Thou before she can ever reply I, before she can ever speak of us and finally it. Through the four figures, Thou, I, We, It, the Word walks through us. The Word must call our name first. We must have listened and obeyed before we can think of command.<sup>39</sup>

For Frankl, “The intimate bond between consciousness and responsibility is recognized by language.”<sup>40</sup> For Rosenstock-Huessy, “The right words, i.e. ‘names,’ guarantees responsiveness.”<sup>41</sup> For Heidegger, “At its base is not speaking a naming, a way of showing in various ways that which listening is allowed to name, that is, attentive listening to what appears?”<sup>42</sup>

A person’s name is a personal identity in that it is unique. Just like there is (present), was (past) and always will be (future): one Greta Garbo, one Enrico Caruso, one John Donne, one Sandra A. Wawrytko. So the person:

Provides the comprehensive and singular meaning of our already lived life as well as our hoped to live futures. This is the interpersonal self, an image of singular reflection as unique as the snowflake.<sup>43</sup>

It is a dynamic “image,” a schemata. As “William James once said that we are as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize us.”<sup>44</sup>

Not only are there as many social selves as others who recognize us but there are as many unrealized aspects as human possibilities. Bergson refers to the person as a measureless virtuality (*immensité de virtualité*). The person is not just limited to actual existence as the possibilities of

actualization are endless. Potentialities of being can transcend successive actualizations. *You are your ownmost possibilities.* The chosen actualized possibilities are reflected in the person's montage. The aspiration toward these possibilities are guided by the values which inhabit our actions. As Gordon Allport says, "Values, as I use the term, are simply *meanings perceived as related to self.*"<sup>45</sup> In 1925 Frankl wrote, in his first piece,<sup>46</sup> that there are no values that are independent to the person's will. Frankl brings this to clarity in regard to the intentional act in that:

Value is transcendent to the act which intends it... Phenomenology has shown that the transcendent quality of the object in the intentional act is always already present in its content.<sup>47</sup>

Values guide aspirations and frequently, aspirations guide choice, both in personal action and in association with others.

As one begins to reflect upon one's own experiential montage the "first family" into which one is born becomes apparent. The "chosen family," association by choice, begins to emerge. For our ongoing example of T.W., the chosen family would include "named" others: Mary Geneva Caruso (shift from first family to chosen family by choice), Sunnie Dance Rising, Frank Eichensehr, Douglas A. Spanier, the old monk, Donald A. Gipson, Thomas Langan, Sandra A. Wawrytko and influence only by their works, Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, William James. The first family (significant others) and chosen family (significant others by choice) have the most impact on the person. These "others" are closest-to one's personal meaning, to one's personal story (*Heilsgeschichte*). The montage blossoms out with the "chosen family," in addition to or in place of the "first family." As Goethe says in his only novel it is an *Elective Affinity* (*Die Wahlverwandtschaften*).


*Specific persons reside at the heart of each person's experiential montage and are considered to be an inspiration.* It is inspiration that lights up possibilities, one's aspirations.<sup>48</sup> This can be viewed as an *inspiration/aspiration dialectic*, it is a relatedness backward or forward not a circular reasoning that begs the question as Heidegger would say. The approach is that originally God (the Other, with a capital O) inspired human beings (the other, with a small o). This ground upon which we have been animated allows for the possibility to inspire others. Transcendence toward God is vertical transcendence and toward others is horizontal transcendence. *Vertical and horizontal transcendence is on the Cross.*

Inspiration tacitly implies openness beyond the self and "*self-transcendence is experienced as breaking through boundaries.*"<sup>49</sup> With inspiration, "It is valued by the person who opts to enact that possibility."<sup>50</sup>

As Frankl says:

Being human means being in the face of meaning to fulfill and values to realize. It means living in the polar field of tension established between reality and ideals to materialize. Man lives by ideals and values. Human existence is not authentic unless it is lived in terms of self-transcendence.<sup>51</sup>

If we view the human being as an aspiring being on the way toward future possibilities it shifts our perspective to the ongoing continuity of the experiential montage. Being includes becoming. Each person is aspiring yet also following something. We can say *here-being-there-becoming*:



**Figure V**  
(see fn., 65)

For Heidegger in looking-toward being requires a looking-away-from coming-into-being and passing-away. As Heraclitus would say the harmonious structure of the world depends upon opposite tension like the bow and lyre. For Heidegger, “this is possible only if something is set *above* being, something that being never is yet but always *ought* to be.”<sup>52</sup> Being is

the power that emerges and discloses. As Frankl says:

If a sound amount of tension such as the tension between reality and ideal, between the “I am” and the “I ought,” is to be preserved, meaning has to be prevented from coinciding with being. I should say that it is the meaning of meaning to set the pace of being. And if being is to keep abreast of meaning, meaning has to be ahead of being.<sup>53</sup>

Heidegger provides ground for the nature of the call and response in that possibilities for experience of authenticity are ontological structures of *Dasein*. Heidegger illustrates this as moments of vision. A call to Self is possible as an appeal. For Heidegger this call to conscience comes from within. We are a being-in-the-world-with-others and if we utilize Heidegger’s positive mode of solicitude, that of, *leaping ahead*, we can say that:

*The appeal to return to the Self in reflection arises not only from the dynamic field of Inbetweenness shared with the inspiring other but from within the inspired person’s own aspiring nature.*<sup>54</sup>

Inspiration comes from beyond and lights up within. As Heidegger says, “Truth is inherent in the essence of being.”<sup>55</sup> Michael Zimmerman would say that the shift from inauthenticity to authenticity cannot be effected by the human being alone, it is possible only with the aid of grace.<sup>56</sup> Grace is Inspiration. As William James would say the ultimate test of what truth means is the conduct it inspires. The call from the other that lights up from within can be further explicated. John Donne would call this *interinanimation*, possible through openness, with *anima* meaning life and *inter* as a ground for reciprocity and with *mation* which denotes action. For Frankl, “openness of existence is reflected by its self-transcendence.”<sup>57</sup> For Heidegger, “*Dasein must transcend.*”<sup>58</sup> To transcend is to go beyond as Frankl says, “The essentially self-transcendent quality of human existence renders man *a being reaching out beyond himself.*”<sup>59</sup> Heidegger tells us:

The answer to the question of the “who” of everyday *Dasein* is to be obtained by analysing that kind of Being in which *Dasein* maintains itself proximally and for the most part. Our investigation takes its orientation from Being-in-the-world—that basic state of *Dasein* by which every mode of its Being gets co-determined.<sup>60</sup>

In everyday life the experiential montage grows, takes on superposed meaning and begins to reveal the discrepant, juxtaposed experience of each person. It shows even the incongruent and conflicting aspects of one’s world

of experience as it begins to reveal “who I am?”:

This is revealed in four dynamic ways through the experiential montage: 1) It *locates* a person, in time and space, “this is me right here right now.” 2) It *shows* the extent of interpersonal influence by any one person. As one reflects upon the arrangement in terms of importance certain significant events of a change in self come forward. 3) It *gives* identity. One that was already there which is specially mine, it cannot be duplicated by another or given to another. 4) It *opens* the person for the possibility of reflection. It is a reflection of “what I have lived and what I aspire to live.”<sup>61</sup>

For each person when “called away” as Frankl would say:

We do have a responsibility—the responsibility of selecting *what* becomes part of eternity as a consequence of our choices. Everything is written into the eternal record—our whole life, all our activities, our experiences, and our suffering...it is...a record which we have to dictate to ourselves.<sup>62</sup>

Experiential montages are interrelated montages, an integral aspect of the whole. At the furthest, in the community sense all-is-one-ness,<sup>63</sup> for Sandra A. Wawrytko this, “fosters the communal attitude so essential for...survival and practical functioning.”<sup>64</sup> Thomas Langan considers this a global situation:

Because interwoven with my personal horizons are those of the others with whom I stand in certain common traditions, as well as those common to all men who exist in the world today, it is easy in our consideration of horizons to slip from personal, to local, to global dimensions. As all the horizons meet in my personal experience, and as all persons meet in the one world, we can see the sense in which there is only one global situation within which there are as many common points of view as there are traditions and as many personal points of view as there are persons.<sup>65</sup>

For Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Life’s experiential montage is an expansion of self.”<sup>66</sup>

## Notes

- 1) Sunnie D. Kidd, “Experiential Montage: The Interpersonal Self”, *Migrant Echo*, X, no. 2 (May-August 1981), p. 125. This work, “The Thought of Frankl, Heidegger and Rosenstock-Huessy as Viewed

- Through Life's Experiential Montage" was originally presented in Berkeley, California at the Institute of Logotherapy 16 January 1984.
- 2) Viktor E. Frankl, *The Will to Meaning* (New York: The New American Library, 1970), p. 152.
  - 3) Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *The Christian Future or The Modern Mind Outrun*, intro. Harold Stahmer (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 116. For Rosenstock-Huessy, God is not a religious proposition.
  - 4) Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).
  - 5) Frankl, *The Will to Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
  - 6) Viktor E. Frankl, "Determinism and Humanism", *Humanitas*, VII, no. 1 (Spring 1971), p. 35.
  - 7) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
  - 8) Viktor E. Frankl, "What Is Meant by Meaning?", *Journal of Existentialism*, VII, no. 25 (Fall 1966), p. 21.
  - 9) Viktor E. Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1969), p. 159.
  - 10) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 276.
  - 11) Rosenstock-Huessy, *The Christian Future*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.
  - 12) Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans., intro. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966).
  - 13) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 155.
  - 14) *Ibid.*, pp. 156-157.
  - 15) Viktor E. Frankl, "Sog Nit Kejnmol" (We Are Here) in Synchronisation in Buchenwald. (Unpublished Play written in 1945).
  - 16) Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Die Sprache des Menschengeschlechts* (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Schneider, 1963), p. 765. Cf. Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *Applied Science of the Soul*, trans. James W. Kidd, intro. Sandra A. Wawrytko (San Francisco: Golden Phoenix Press, 1984).

- 17) Rosenstock-Huessy, *The Christian Future*, *op. cit.*, p. 116.
- 18) Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans., intro. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 154.
- 19) *Ibid.*, p. 155.
- 20) Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 201. Heidegger in this cited work says, "To be a man means to *take* gathering *upon oneself*, to undertake a gathering apprehension of the being of the essent, the sapient incorporation of appearing in the work, and so to *administer* <verwalten> unconcealment, to *preserve* it against cloaking and concealment." ( p. 174.)
- 21) Viktor E. Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul* (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 78.
- 22) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 161.
- 23) Kidd, "Experiential Montage: The Interpersonal Self", *op. cit.*, p. 125.
- 24) Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
- 25) Sandra A. Wawrytko, *The Undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought* (Washington: University Press of America, 1981), p. 39.
- 26) Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
- 27) *Ibid.*, fn., p. 5.
- 28) *Ibid.*, fn., pp. 5-6.
- 29) Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1911), pp. 5-6.
- 30) Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
- 31) Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, *I Am an Impure Thinker*, foreword W. H. Auden, ed., intro Freya von Moltke and Clinton C. Gardner (Norwich: Argo Books, 1970), p. 44.
- 32) Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 134.
- 33) *Ibid.*, p. 127.

- 34) Kidd, "Experiential Montage: The Interpersonal Self", *op. cit.*, p. 127.
- 35) Henri Bergson, *Mind-Energy*, trans. H. Wildon Carr (London: Macmillan, 1920), p. 186.
- 36) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 416. Heidegger in this cited work says, "The ontological meaning of 'care' is temporality." ( p. 416.)
- 37) Frankl, *Man's Search for Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- 38) Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, *op. cit.*, p. 13.
- 39) Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, "Liturgical Thinking" (II), *Orate Fratres*, pp. 12-13. Cross referenced from Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, in "Speak That I May See Thee!" by Harold Stahmer (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 130.
- 40) Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, *op. cit.*, fn., p. 5.
- 41) Rosenstock-Huessy, *I am an Impure Thinker*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
- 42) Martin Heidegger, "Some Reflections on the Principle Viewpoints at the Theological Colloquium on the Problem of a Non-Objective Thinking and a Non-Objective Speaking in Modern Theology" Freiburg in Breisgau, 11 March 1964, trans. James Garceau.
- 43) Kidd, "Experiential Montage: The Interpersonal Self", *op. cit.*, p. 125.
- 44) *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- 45) Gordon Allport, *The Person in Psychology* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 164.
- 46) Viktor E. Frankl, *Internationale Zeitschrift für Individualpsychologie*, III (1925), pp. 250-252. Cross referenced from Herbert Spiegelberg, *Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), p. 347.
- 47) Frankl, *The Doctor and the Soul*, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- 48) Oxford English Dictionary, 1933. INSPIRATION: p. 345. ad. L. *inspiration-em*, N. of action from *inspirare* to INSPIRE. The action of breathing or inhaling. ASPIRATION: p. 496. ad. L. *aspiration-em*, N. of action from *aspirare* to ASPIRE. The action of breathing or

drawing one's breath; a breath, a sigh.

- 49) Sunnie D. Kidd and James W. Kidd, *The Dynamic Aspects of Inspiration* (Golden Phoenix Press, 1982), p. 25. This work takes a hard stand on the question: was I inspired by God or the devil? Utilizing Heidegger's idea of solicitude, inspiration frees for (*ahead of*) and possession strips from (*leaping in*). In terms of relationship as soon as one enters in relation with the devil you are possessed.
- 50) *Ibid.*, p. 26.
- 51) Viktor E. Frankl, "Self-Transcendence as a Human Phenomenon", *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*, VI, no. 2 (Fall 1966), p. 104.
- 52) Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
- 53) Frankl, "Self-Transcendence as a Human Phenomenon", *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- 54) Kidd and Kidd, *The Dynamic Aspects of Inspiration*, *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- 55) Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, *op. cit.*, p. 102.
- 56) Michael Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), pp. 144-145.
- 57) Frankl, "Determinism and Humanism", *op. cit.*, p. 30.
- 58) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 415.
- 59) Frankl, *The Will to Meaning*, *op. cit.*, p. 8.
- 60) Heidegger, *Being and Time*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.
- 61) Kidd, "Experiential Montage: The Interpersonal Self", *op. cit.*, pp. 126-127.
- 62) Viktor E. Frankl, "Time and Responsibility", *Existential Psychiatry*, I, no. 3 (Fall 1966), pp. 363-364.
- 63) Wawrytko, *The Undercurrent of Feminine Philosophy in Eastern and Western Thought*, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
- 64) *Ibid.*, p. 124.

- 65) Thomas Langan, *Self-Discovery* (San Francisco: Golden Phoenix Press, 1985), p. 35. If we choose to move with Langan's idea of dimensions we might say that the montage is a way of displaying dimensional ontology. See Figure V. In a personal communication 27 January 1985 in San Francisco upon looking at Figure V, Thomas Langan suggested many further ideas especially a Figure VI. But specifically to mention that, "the past provides the possibility for the future to open up." The future makes present in the process of having been.
- 66) This concise statement was presented by Sandra A. Wawrytko during discussion after the presentation, at The World Congress of Logotherapy IV, 30 June 1984, of the experiential montage.

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