GEORG W. F. HEGEL, JEAN-PAUL SARTRE AND MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY: WHERE AND HOW DO THEY MEET?

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Introduction:
Continental philosophy is, perhaps, the most sophisticated movement in modern philosophy. It encompasses some paramount thinkers, such as Søren Kierkegaard, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir, among others. Such richness of thought and leading thinkers can be viewed as a collectivity of complex responses to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

Hegel, in fact, is so essential that as a thinker combined with said responses, pro and anti-Hegelian, gave rise to a new movement known as Hegelianism and Post-Hegelianism. Such movement influenced thought in general, and contributed a great deal to many sub-schools of continental philosophy in particular, such as existentialism, Marxism and phenomenology. The thumbprint of many Hegelian themes, such as the master/slave dialectic, the struggle for recognition, unhappy consciousness, and social intersubjectivity, cannot be denied.

Hegel was also controversial among many philosophers, where they greatly disagreed interpreting his work and viewing his role within the discipline of philosophy. He was both denounced and lauded. Arthur Schopenhauer, who was a colleague of Hegel at the University of Berlin, declared Hegel as “a charlatan”, called his work “the monument of German stupidity” and wrote:

But the height of audacity in serving up pure nonsense, in stringing together senseless and extravagant mazes of words… was finally reached in Hegel.¹

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, thought that all great philosophical ideas, which came after Hegel, have their roots in Hegel’s thought.²

In this paper, I will give a synopsis of some of Hegel’s central themes, such as the phenomenological journey of consciousness, the master/slave dialectic and how they are related to history and freedom. I will discuss Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-ponty’s responses to and/or understanding of some of these Hegelian themes. Finally, I will conclude with summarizing the main points. This shall establish a relationship among these thinkers and bring them into mutual dialogue.

The Phenomenological Journey Of Consciousness Towards Absolute Spirit:
In The Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel presents a logical process of how humans evolved from simple consciousness to Absolute Spirit, where reason, evolving consciousness, dialectic interactive struggle and freedom are in the midst of such evolution. Such human evolution is of Spirit realizing itself. The dialectical movement from thesis to antithesis to synthesis fuels this realization. This movement of thought is the foundation upon which Hegel builds his all-inclusive system.

Hegelian phenomenology is the approach to understanding the interdependent parts of knowledge as appearances, where configurations of consciousness are revealed over time as historical and cultural phenomena. These configurations of consciousness
are used to explain how knowledge and experience are in dialectic interactive struggle when consciousness tries to know the world. Hegel’s phenomenology, moreover, illustrates how consciousness overcomes this struggle between its knowledge and its experience as it comes to know itself and the world. The result of overcoming this struggle gives rise to a more evolved configuration of consciousness. We, as readers, witness how such evolution takes place through history, Hegel’s that is, how the interdependent cultural and social phenomena make the world what it is and how this historic journey concludes in Hegel’s phenomenology. This evolution is a journey of purification of consciousness towards true knowledge—i.e., towards the ultimate knowledge that is Spirit.³

Spirit, for Hegel, is basically self-conscious reason. Spirit refers to norms, manners and patterns of knowledge and shared meaning of social and cultural intersubjectivity. The highest of the cultural forms of Spirit are art, religion and philosophy. Spirit, additionally, entitles and defines social and political institutions as embodiments of the socially and culturally shared patterns of knowledge, meaning and practices, which define the community. These institutions, furthermore, encompass the historical spirit of its community.⁴

The aforementioned journey starts with simple consciousness developing into philosophical knowledge, where consciousness demonstrates a bipolar relation between a knowing subject and known object. These bipolars, for Hegel, are knowing and truth.⁵ It is when a conflict arises between the experience of the experiencing consciousness and its knowledge, where consciousness rebuilds the relationship between knowledge and objects as to correspond with its experience. Consciousness evolves, over this predicament of being challenged between knowing and truth, by the reconstruction towards a more complex unity of consciousness and objects. This leads to a new configuration of consciousness. This, for Hegel, is the dialectical experience of consciousness.⁶

The Independent And Dependent Self-consciousness: A Struggle for Desired Recognition: This part, for Hegel, is the outcome of development of consciousness of world into the more rational self-consciousness. It, furthermore, shows the different forms of false freedoms, as we shall see. The transition from consciousness to self-consciousness is caused by the experience of desire. When satisfying our animal desires, for example, we come to realize and know ourselves more. Such desires, however, do not dissipate through their satisfaction and constantly reappear asking for more. When one gains a desired object, for instance, one is only temporarily satisfied leading to a brief incomplete sense of self-identity. Such gain will, soon, be useless when facing a desire for another object. This provides, only, a temporary false freedom. Hegel, here, claims that only in desiring recognition, from another desiring self-conscious human, one will be satisfied and gain a true sense of self-identity:

...Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.⁷

This interaction of the two is that of conflict. Each self-consciousness tires to uphold its independence and maintain its self-identity by negating the other. This causes a struggle to the death. The death of the other, however, will not be productive. One is better off being recognized by the other, instead of being triumphant over a useless body
that is incapable of recognition. One, thus, submits to the other sacrificing one’s independence and becoming the slave. The other, therefore, is recognized as the master.

The master, in actuality, gained an empty victory; being dependent on the slave’s labor to be able to satisfy his desires as a master. His mastery, self-identity and received recognition are as significant as the dependent slave. The slave, in actuality, has surpassed and is beyond the master:

…the slave, who—through fear of death—grasps the (human) Nothingness that is at the foundation of his (natural) Being, understands himself, understands Man, better than the Master does. From the “first” Fight, the Slave has an intuition of the human reality, and that is the profound reason that it is finally he, and not the Master, who will complete History by revealing the truth of Man, by revealing his reality through Hegelian Science.9

This experience, as seen, allows the slave to come so close to death enabling him to grasp his own finitude. It is crucial, here, to notice that the master does not have this experience, which allows the slave to surpass him. Only the slave, when facing death, is enabled to experience the nearness of the negation of everything that he is. This puts the slave in touch with his true being in contrast to the nothingness that he nearly came to be. In addition to realizing what he ontologically is, the slave also realizes and comprehends what reality is, what human nature is and the value of freedom. When, the slave chooses life over death, he, through action, controls his desire. This teaches him the value of action and work. Action and work, or service for others, puts the slave in a direct relationship with the community, giving him a role within history.

The slave is still, however, indebted to the master and the master is still dependent on the slave’s labor. Both are bound by the relationship of recognition, where neither can transcend towards freedom. This brings about the essentiality of freedom for both.

Hegel, here, deals with what he calls the “unhappy consciousness,” where subjects are torn between dichotomies. He defines such consciousness as “the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, merely contradictory being.”10 The unhappy consciousness, in this particular case for instance, is aware of its freedom, yet, it is stuck in the debilitating master/slave situatedness. It is stuck between the universality of thought and particularity of its situatedness, failing to realize that itself, even in particularity, is, so to speak, a manifestation of the universal Spirit. This unhappy consciousness will, eventually, be able to evolve reaching a unity.

At the end of evolvement into advanced configurations of self-consciousness, such consciousness will gain the freedom and independence it longs for. It will reach a “turning point” during the realization of the oneness of “I” and “we”, particularly in the “Notion of Spirit”, and transcend the world of sense into the spiritual world.11

What does the aforementioned have to do with history and freedom?
As noted above, knowledge and experience play a role in what consciousness is and how it evolves. One of Hegel’s central ideas is the historicity of knowledge and experience, where we are temporal beings whose knowledge and experience are significantly shaped by the history we live in and by the manner in which we shape such history.12 History, nonetheless, is much more.
History, for Hegel, is not a mere chronological process nor a coincidental succession of events. History is a rational and evolving process of events, where reason manifests itself into reality. Reason, for Hegel, in fact, is the “substance,” “infinite power,” and “infinite material of all life.” This is philosophical history. Even if history seems irrational and bloody, philosophic history is the realization of Idea of freedom. What we see as violent and unreasonable within history, however, are the short-term actions of historic agents who are motivated by egoistic self-interests. The rationality of a historical society, as we shall see next, is deeply dependent on its degree of evolvement towards this Idea of freedom.

The Idea of freedom becomes actualized and grounded in reality through the actions of humans. The Idea of freedom, therefore, begins its realization in the Orient, where only the emperor is free. The spirit of freedom, then, moves west to Greece, where some male citizens are free and the majority is not. The Idea of freedom becomes self-realized in the West, particularly in the Germanic world, where everybody is free. Freedom, here, is universal and individuals are recognized as rationally free.

Sartre Meets Hegel:
Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, uses two Hegelian themes to critique Hegel, namely the master/slave dialectic and unhappy consciousness. Sartre believes that Hegelian phenomenology failed to give an account of “the existence of Others”, which is the name of the chapter in which Sartre critiques Hegel. Hegel, according to Sartre, reduces the ontological Other to a mere epistemology. The Other instead should be seen as an ontological existence—i.e., a relationship of an existing being of self and Other.

Sartre starts by discussing “human reality” from the aspects of “negating conduct” and from the Cartesian cogito, where such reality “is-for-itself.” We are not mere subjects knowing others as objects when coming across them. Sartre, nonetheless, meets Hegel, where we are subjects knowing themselves when we see ourselves being perceived by others. The two depart, however, where Hegel considers the encounter between being-for-itself and another mostly epistemological. Sartre, on the other hand, as mentioned, considers being-for-itself encountering others as an “ontological structure,” revealing my own being “for-myself.” This, for Sartre, instead of Hegelian recognition, brings shame—as a result of the look—to the forefront.

Shame is “a mode of consciousness,” which is very similar to the above-mentioned ontological structure. This is “non-positional self-consciousness conscious of itself as shame.” It is a shame of something, which is myself. It relates myself to myself. Shame, nonetheless, is “before somebody” other than myself. Shame is, in fact, “by nature recognition,” where I recognize myself as others recognize me. The shame I experience of myself is, at the same time, experienced before the Other. These two aspects mutually coexist and are not separable. Ontologically likewise, I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being.

Thus shame is shame of oneself before the Other; these two structures are inseparable. But at the same time I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being.

Shame is used to explain the relationship between one’s being and the Other’s. This shame, caused by being seen by the Other, makes one aware of oneself as being an object
for the Other’s look. One’s objectification is only possible because the Other is subject. Others, therefore, are needed for this situatedness of shame. This constitutes the existence of the Other as an a priori. It is also how one’s being is related to oneself and to the Other. The relationship, here, is reciprocal and bi-directional. One, for instance, can escape one’s objectification by objectifying the Other and, in doing so, becomes the subject.

To truly understand this account of existential ontology, Sartre, suggest that we need to understand “the existence of the Other” and “the relation of my being to the being of the Other.” As noted above, “the look” and “shame” can give an idea of how one’s being is in relation to the Other’s. But in what manner is one aware of “the existence of the Other”?

The existence of others, for Sartre, is an experience of negation, where “others are the Other …which is not myself.” This negation, furthermore, is “the constitutive structure of the being-of-others.” This does not constitute nothingness, where such nothingness gives rise to all possibilities of relations between one and the Other. This negation, additionally, sheds further light on this meeting between Hegel and Sartre.

Sartre, here, praises Hegel for realizing that “the appearance of the Other” gives rise to the “existence of my consciousness as self-consciousness,” where “the self apprehends itself.” “I am I” and “Myself = Myself” of such self-consciousness is constituted as my identity and my existence, in relation to the Other:

Thus Hegel’s brilliant intuition is to make me depend on the Other in my being. I am, he said, a being for-itself which is for-itself only through another.

Self-consciousness is distinctly what it is by exclusion, where one is what one is by being excluded from being another. The Other, on the other hand, is what the Other is by being excluded from being me.

The Other, furthermore, “mediates between my consciousness for itself and itself,” where I am dependent on the Other. Such mediation gives rise to what I am through recognition. This, as seen earlier, is the master/slave struggle for Hegel.

One and the Other, here, appear to each other as body-objects. Each, thus, seeks recognition of one’s free subjectivity from the Other. Each, therefore, risks one’s life, until one submits becoming the slave, making the other master.

Sartre, then, objects on two bases ending the confrontation with Hegel. He does so by calling Hegel “guilty of an epistemological optimism” and “ontological optimism.”

Epistemological optimism because, according to Sartre, Hegel sees the relationship between one and the Other as knowledge:

But by holding that self-consciousness is expressed by the “I am I”—i.e., by identifying it with self-knowledge—he failed to derive the consequences of his first affirmation; for he introduced into consciousness something like an object existing potentially to be disengaged without change by the Other.

Hegel, according to Sartre, views one and the Other as each subject sees the Other as object that can be known and therefore, must be conquered—i.e., Hegel reduces being to the mere knowledge of an object. This causes one to be unable to know oneself in the
Other since the Other is a mere object. One, additionally, cannot “apprehend the Other in his true being—that is, in his subjectivity.”

Ontological optimism is Hegel placing himself, as an “Absolute,” “at the vantage point of truth—i.e., of the Whole.” The result of such action, when accounting for the experience of the individual consciousness, is the overlooking of subjectivity as it vanishes into a mere side within the rational whole, where “plurality can and must be surpassed toward the totality.”

Sartre, as a result to what he sees as Hegel’s failure, calls for the return to the cogito. Individual consciousness, here, is not only mere knowledge, where one can transcend one’s own being achieving reciprocal recognition. This gives rise to self-knowledge in relation to the Other, where both beings are equivalent:

In a word the sole point of departure is the interiority of the cogito. We must understand by this that each one must be able by starting out from his own interiority, to rediscover the Other’s being as a transcendence which conditions the very being of that interiority. This of necessity implies that the multiplicity of consciousness is on principle unsurpassable, for I can undoubtedly transcend myself toward a Whole, but I cannot establish myself in this Whole so as to contemplate myself and to contemplate the Other. No logical or epistemological optimism can cover the scandal of the plurality of consciousness. If Hegel believed that it could, this is because he never grasped the nature of that particular dimension of being which is self-consciousness.

Sartre’s critique, here, is due, as seen above, to Hegel’s standpoint when accounting for the singularity of the individual’s own existence. Hegel has excluded himself, as an existent, from his phenomenological account. This was the result of Hegel placing himself as the Whole. Due to this failure, Sartre calls for the return to the cogito. The ontology of individual consciousness, here, is not reducible to mere knowledge. There is no possibility, thus, that individuality can be transcended for a reciprocal recognition, where self and the Other are to be equals. Hegel’s account, therefore, according to Sartre, is epistemologically and ontologically fallacious. The ontological separation between “plurality of consciousness,” therefore, is existentially scandalous. Sartre, thus, calls for the return to the interiority of the cogito in order to overcome the problem of the Other.

Merleau-Ponty Meets Hegel and Sartre:

After Merleau-Ponty gives a fair consideration of Hegel’s all-embracing philosophical system and how it covers a wide range of philosophical topics, he critiques Sartre in favor of what he calls Hegelian existentialism. Merleau-Ponty starts his account by discussing how Søren Kierkegaard sees Hegel, which is, partially, also a good response to Sartre’s critique of Hegel on the base of the individual. Part of the problem it seems that “Hegel successors have placed” more importance “on what they reject” of Hegel’s philosophy “than what they owe to” it. This is not to say, in any manner, that Merleau-Ponty does not differ and/or disagree with Hegel.

Kierkegaard, as the father of Existentialism, intentionally placed himself and his philosophy “in opposition to Hegel.” According to Merleau-Ponty, Kierkegaard’s
criticism of Hegel’s philosophy, as the mere “palace of ideas,” is fair but only of the later
Hegel. “The Hegel of 1827,”40 which is the idealist who:

- treated history as the visible development of a logical system, who sought
  in the relationships between ideas the final explanation of events, and who
  subordinated the individual experience of life to the life appropriate to
  ideas, as to destiny.41

This criticism, according to Merleau-Ponty, cannot be said about “the Hegel of 1807.”42

The Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit that is.

On the one hand, the Hegel of 1827, according to Merleau-Ponty, can be

criticized by Kierkegaard as seeing “historical antitheses” being over come by thought,
where mere thought is not enough to give the individual the capacity to overcome
confronting contradictions. Yes, this Hegel has profound understanding, yet, he forgot
and neglected his own existence. The Hegel of 1807, on the other hand, has not only
established an idealist vision but an all-embracing historical account of “customs,
ecological structure, legal institutions” and above all “works of philosophy.”43

Merleau-Ponty confronts Hegel by arguing that Hegel is an existentialist, where
the latter’s phenomenology brings to light a philosophical account of immanent historical
experience and finite human existence. Hegel, according to Merleau-Ponty, reveals “the
immanent logic of human experience in all its sectors.”44

Merleau-Ponty, contradicting Kierkegaard and Sartre, does not believe that Hegel forgot his existence nor actually
placed himself as God’s mind, or the Absolute/Whole. Hegel actually mentioned that:

- the philosopher should not put himself in the place of human experiences;
  his task is simply to collect and decipher these experiences as history
  makes them available.45

Unlike Kant, according to Merleau-Ponty, Hegel’s concept of experience

ecompasses religious, moral and aesthetic experiences. Hegel is, furthermore, an
existentialist who illustrates how the individual:

- not as being from the start a consciousness in full possession of its own
  clear thoughts but as a life which is its own responsibility and which tries
  to understand itself.46

Such consciousness moves from “subjective certainty” through skepticism to learn from
its own experience to be able to reach “objective truth” within historical time.47

Merleau-Ponty, in addition, suggests that as long as there is consciousness of life,
there will be consciousness of death. Consciousness of death takes two forms, where one
is “pathetic and complacent” and the other is “dry and resolute.”48

The first “butts against our end and seeks nothing in it but the means of exacerbating violence,” while the
other “integrates death into itself and turns it into a sharper awareness of life.”49

The young Hegel, according to Merleau-Ponty, speaks of death, where the older Hegel speaks
more of negativity. The Hegel of the Phenomenology of Spirit shows how the
consciousness of death represents the coming into place for humanity. Consciousness of
death is the consciousness of the universal, where death “is the negation of all particular
given beings.”50

The only possible manner, moreover, is to envisage nothingness and to
do so against being. Sartre, here, joins the dialogue by adding, “against the world.”51

To
amplify such awareness of death, it has to be integrated into life or “interiorized”, as Hegel said.\textsuperscript{52}

Amplifying the experience of death of self-certain subjects, how consciousness of death represents the coming into place for humanity and the conflicting nature of self-conscious freedom, cannot be discussed without the master/slave dialectic. This Hegelian theme is used by Merleau-Ponty to direct the dialogue, during this meeting, towards Sartre. Merleau-Ponty, here, speaks of an authentic experience of the awareness of death, where each subject tries to turn the other into an object. The first self-conscious subject becomes an object because of the gaze of the second one, where the second, mutually, becomes an object, within this shared world, as a result of the first one’s gaze:

Thus each consciousness seeks the death of the other which it feels dispossesses it of its constitutive nothingness.\textsuperscript{53}

This is possible, however, only if one is aware of one’s own subjectivity during which the other is reducing one to an object. One, additionally, does not reduce the other to slavery except when the other is a constant presence of consciousness and freedom during which this other is an object in one’s eyes. The conflict arises, thus, when both are aware of the reciprocity of this relationship and the commonality of human ground. One’s negation of the other is complete only by negation in response. One’s self-consciousness, furthermore, as death and nothingness, encompasses an affirmation of one’s being and life. One’s consciousness of the other as an opponent, likewise, contains the other’s equality. One realizes what one is, thus, in the other, just as one realizes the consciousness of life in the consciousness of death. One is, after all, the combination of “life and death, solitude and communication…”\textsuperscript{54}

Sartre’s notion, of the ontological separation of subjects, in Merleau-Ponty’s vision, makes the reciprocal recognition between such subjects unattainable. For Sartre’s vision, here, is “antithetic,” where “in-itself” and “for-itself” are too opposed.\textsuperscript{55} Yes, for Merleau-Ponty, there will always be a defining ambiguity of existence; the ambiguity of subject and object, freedom and facticity, the visible and invisible. One, however, still discovers oneself in the other, where conflict does not render mutual recognition impossible, instead, such recognition gives rise to intersubjective struggle.

Up to this point Hegel is an existentialist, but he surely departs, this Merleau-Pontian categorization, when he moves from the individual’s experience to the experience of history. Hegel, in fact, sees the individual’s experience of death as an evolvement into “a higher form of life,” where individual experience becomes historic existence.\textsuperscript{56}

Merleau-Ponty, in the second chapter of The Visible and the Invisible, discusses Sartre’s analytic of being and nothingness and the Hegelian dialectic fueling its heart. He sees the accomplishments of Sartre’s philosophy, especially in the manner of how it came to see the individual subject’s situatedness within an objective world. This is:

subjectivity that is nothing is in the immediate presence of being or in contact with the world.\textsuperscript{57}

Such analytic, nonetheless, is problematic, which is due to its absolute opposition of pure being and pure nothingness. This makes them lack the ability to be “defined by anything that would be proper to them.”\textsuperscript{58} This causes the analytic to be stuck within the abstract
domain and, therefore, unable to be experienced in concreteness. This “bad dialectic,” thus, has to be replaced by a dialectic:

capable of reaching truth because it envisages without restriction the plurality of the relationships and what has been called ambiguity.\textsuperscript{59}

Merleau-Ponty takes this stand against the Hegelian dialectic in favor of his “hyperdialectic.” Dialectic is the philosophical manner of expressing the relationship between categories. It represents the negative movement of conceptual thought from one category to its opposing category to a synthesis of both. Such dialectic, therefore, amplifies negation in order to form positivity, where antitheses are constituted by the negation of theses. Syntheses, thus, are the result of such negative movement of thought, where both thesis and antithesis are canceled out yet preserved into the new synthesis. A new synthesis is, therefore, a combined conceptual unity. Merleau-Ponty, here, wonders if this dialectic gives a fair philosophical articulation of the polarity of the concrete experience of the embodied being. The reduction of the experience of the embodied being into mere thought and abstraction is the outcome of this bad dialectic; a neglect of human reality.

Hyperdialectic, contrarily, does not employ theses as idealizations, where, for example,

\begin{quote}
Being is not made up of idealizations... but of bound wholes where signification never is except in tendency, where the inertia of the content never permits the defining of one term as positive, another term as negative, and still less a third term as absolute suppression of the negative by itself. The point to be noted is this: that the dialectic without synthesis of which we speak is not therefore scepticism, vulgar relativism, or the reign of the ineffable.\textsuperscript{60}
\end{quote}

Hyperdialectic, instead, is able to encompass the concrete and go beyond the metaphysical opposing categories, such as being for-itself and being in-itself, in order to give room to the plurality and ambiguity of being. This, for Merleau-Ponty, is the understanding of “chiasm” between perception and being, which gives rise to our corporeal experience of the world.

Merleau-Ponty introduces his hyperdialectic as an investigative, qualitative method of being in its concreteness—e.g., humans as corporeal beings. He sees the Hegelian dialectic as being stuck in the idealistic realm. Being, as seen in the previous quote, is not only and purely idealistic, where it is defined by the positive, the negative (nothingness) and their synthesis. Being, instead, is a whole consisting of interdependent and interrelated parts. Such hyperdialectic, for example, can embrace the ambiguity of form and matter inherently without the necessity for a synthesis. Hyperdialectic is capable of this achievement because it lacks the extreme opposition, between thesis and antithesis, and lacks the negative suppression of Hegelian dialectic.

\textit{Conclusion:}
I will abridge the outcome of this meeting by considering the main points. Sartre agrees with Hegel that the master/slave dialectic provides a ground for self-consciousness as the result of the relationship between Self and the Other. Sartre, nonetheless, disagrees with Hegel because the latter reduces the ontology of the Other to an epistemological account.
Sartre adds that Hegel is guilty of an ontological optimism and an epistemological optimism. The ontological optimism is the result of Hegel placing himself in place of the Whole causing him to be an Absolute. When accounting for self-consciousness, thus, the individual is put into the unity of the whole, which causes individuality to be existentially overlooked and misunderstood. The Epistemological optimism is due to Hegel’s account of considering the relation between Self and Other as a mere knowledge relation. Each, as a result, turns the other into a mere object, which can be mastered and conquered. There is an ontological separation, here, which leads to conflict among subjects.

Merleau-Ponty disagrees with existentialists, such as Kierkegaard, when they view Hegel as a mere idealist who overlooks the concreteness of existence. Hegel is, in fact, an existentialist, especially the early Hegel who accounts for all sectors of human experiences within the concrete world.

Merleau-Ponty goes against Sartre, emphasizing that the conflict between Self and the Other does not provide for the impossibility of recognition. Mutual recognition, in fact, gives rise to the possibility of conflict.

Merleau-Ponty considers the traditional Hegelian dialectic to be insufficient. He proposes a hyperdialectic. This dialectic encompasses the ambiguity of our existence as embodied beings. This dialectic takes differences into account without forcing them into conceptual opposition resulting into a negative movement of thought.

Notes:


7) *Ibid.*, § 175 (Italicization is from original source).
12) This over time developed further and, later on, became a significant theme in Hermeneutics, where historicity is vital for many scholars like Hans-Georg Gadamer.
17) *Ibid*.
18) *Ibid*.
19) *Ibid*.
21) *Ibid*.
23) *Ibid*.
27) *Ibid*.
34) *Ibid*.
35) Ibid.
36) Ibid., p. 329.
37) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Sense and Non-Sense*, op. cit., pp. 67, 68. Merleau-Ponty also discusses Hegel and Sartre in *The Visible and The Invisible* as we shall see latter.
39) Ibid., p. 64.
40) Ibid.
41) Ibid.
42) Ibid.
43) Ibid.
44) Ibid., p. 65.
45) Ibid.
46) Ibid.
47) Ibid., p. 66.
48) Ibid., p. 67.
49) Ibid.
50) Ibid.
51) Ibid.
52) Ibid.
53) Ibid., p. 68.
54) Ibid.
55) Ibid., p. 72.
56) Ibid., p. 69.
58) Ibid.
59) Ibid., p. 94.
60) Ibid., pp. 94-95. It is worth mentioning, here, that Merleau-Ponty passed on before completing his hyperdialectic project.